

















































Abstract. In many countries organized as federations, fiscal-equalization schemes have been 
implemented to mitigate vertical or horizontal imbalances. Such schemes usually imply that the 
member states of the federation can only partly internalize marginal tax revenue before 
redistribution. Aside from this internalized revenue, referred to as the marginal tax-back rate, 
the remainder is redistributed. We investigate the extent to which extent state-level authorities 
in such federation under-exploit their tax bases. By means of a stylized model we show that the 
member states have an incentive to align the effective tax rates on their residents with the level 
of the tax-back rate. We empirically test the model using state-level and micro-level taxpayer 
data, OLS regressions and natural experiments. Our empirical findings support the results from 
our theoretical model. Particularly, we find that states with a higher marginal tax-back rate 
exploit the tax base to a higher extent. 
 
JEL-Codes: C21, H21, H77 
Key words: fiscal federalism, fiscal externalities, natural experiment, treatment analysis, 
statistical matching 
♠ Timm Bönke, Freie Universität Berlin, School of Business and Economics; Beate Jochimsen, Department of 
Economics, Berlin School of Economics and Law, and German Institute for Economic Research; Carsten 
Schröder, DIW/SOEP and Freie Universität Berlin, School of Business and Economics. All correspondence to: 
timm.boenke@fu-berlin.de. We thank Sebastian Paul and Benjamin Beckers for research assistance and 
participants in research seminars at the Universities of Muenster, Berlin, Duisburg-Essen and Vienna for many 
helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. For the same reason, our thanks go to Johannes Bröcker, Thiess 
Büttner, Giacomo Corneo, Helmut Herwartz, and Sarah Necker. 
- 1 - 
 
                                                 
1 Introduction  
Fiscal equalization schemes are an important feature of public finance frameworks and are 
common in federal systems of government. Countries that have implemented fiscal equalization 
schemes include Canada, Switzerland, Australia and Germany. In the United States, there is no 
explicit federal equalization scheme for reducing fiscal disparities between the states. However, 
vertical federal-state transfers such as education programs aimed at the disadvantaged, food and 
nutrition programs and Medicaid have an equalizing component. 
Theoretical research on the incentives of fiscal equalization schemes and federalism in general 
has a long tradition. Pioneering works on the assignment of functions to different governmental 
layers and appropriate fiscal instruments date back to Musgrave (1959) and Oates (1972). 1 The 
role of inter-regional spillover effects due to mobile tax bases or inter-regional externalities in 
the provision of public goods has been investigated in Oates (1972), Boadway and Flatters 
(1982), Inman and Rubinfeld (1992), or Manasse and Schultz (1999). Other scholars investigate 
asymmetric information over local preferences for public goods (e.g., Cremer et al., 1996; 
Bucovetsky et al., 1998), over technologies for the provision of public goods (e.g. Boadway et 
al., 1995; Raff and Wilson, 1997; Caplan et al., 2000; Breuillé and Gary-Bobo, 2007; Akai and 
Silva, 2009), and over local tax bases (Bordignon et al., 2001). 
The present study investigates, both theoretically and empirically, the relationships between 
fiscal equalization and the enforcement of a uniform tax law in a federation where the member 
states are responsible for the enforcement of the tax and carry the related costs. In such a 
federation, tax enforcement might depend on the state-specific pecuniary returns of the 
enforcement activities. These pecuniary returns, at the margin, are determined by the state-
specific marginal tax-back rates (𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇): 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 is how much they can keep of any additional taxes 
levied after fiscal equalization (as opposed to being redistributed to other states or the federal 
government through fiscal equalization schemes). Even in the presence of a uniform de jure tax 
tariff, states also have de facto instruments to steer tariffs. These may include a varying 
incidence and intensity of tax audits, differing interpretations of complex tax issues,2 and the 
use of vague formulations in the tax code.3 Using such instruments create inefficiencies, 
violates the equal treatment of equals, and in all likelihood undermines the tax morality of tax 
payers. 
1 For a game theoretic analysis see De Figueiredo (2005). 
2 For the interplay between accuracy and complexity of income taxation see also Kaplow (1998). 
3 For example, in Germany, the level of expenses exceeding blanket allowances and qualified as deductible, despite 
some guidelines, is a decision ex aequo et bono of the auditing tax agent. An overview of several norms in the 
German income tax code with vague legal terms is provided in Bönke et al. (2011), Table A1 in the Appendix. 
- 2 - 
 
                                                 
 In the light of the above, we make a theoretical and an empirical contribution to the literature. 
On the theoretical side, we set up a stylized Samuelson (1954) type model that reflects the 
characteristics of the federation described above, taking the German system as a real-world 
example. The model reveals that benevolent state-level planners align the effective tax burdens 
on their taxpayers with the internalized marginal tax revenue (𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇) collected from the 
taxpayers. The 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇 is how much a state can keep from a marginal increase in the tax base after 
fiscal equalization. It is the product of two variables: the marginal tax rate of a tax unit and the 
state-specific 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇. The model shows that the effective tax burden of a given taxpayer will 
systematically vary with the tax-back rate of the state where the taxpayer lives: Provided that 
the substitution effect dominates the income effect, states with a higher 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇 exploit the tax 
base to a higher extent.  
On the empirical side, we use administrative German data to test the model implication that 
states with a higher 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇 exploit the tax base to a higher extent. We perform two types of testing. 
The first type uses aggregated state-level data, and studies how differences in average 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇s 
alter tax enforcement. Tax enforcement is measured by an input variable, the staffing of tax 
administrations in the states. The analysis is also motivated by a report of the German Federal 
Audit Office (2006, p. 78f.) according to which differences in the personnel endowments of tax 
offices undermine the “uniformity of taxation” (Federal Audit Office, 2006, p. 122). Consistent 
with the model, we find a positive statistical association between average 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇 and staffing. 
The second type uses micro data on taxpayers and an output variable as the tax enforcement 
indicator: the amount of income tax deductions granted to the tax units. The use of micro data 
allows us to disentangle the two components of 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇, the 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 and the taxpayer-specific 
marginal tax rates. Particularly we exploit several natural experiments to provide causal 
evidence of the states’ incentive problem. This experiments are based on observed 
discontinuities in the 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇s of some German states. Consistent with the model, we find that an 
exogenous increase of the 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 in one state lowers its tax-enforcement activities compared with 
states that have a constant 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇.  
This is not the first study on the interplay between fiscal equalization and taxation. Previous 
studies include Oates (1999); Zhuravaskya (2000); Bordignon et al. (2001); Mikesell (2003); 
Esteller-Moré (2005); Martinez-Vazquez and Timofeev (2005); Buettner and Wildasin (2006); 
Libman and Feld (2013); Egger et al. (2009); or Mogues et al. (2009).4 Blöchliger et al. (2007) 
4 Another strand of literature focuses on tax enforcement and tax administration. Influential studies include 
Slemrod and Yitzhaki (1991) and Mayshar (1991). 
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argue that equalization rates are “one of the most debated issues in fiscal equalization” (p. 16), 
and continue: “Lenient tax effort, especially if tax administration is under sub-central control, 
may (...) be a result of high equalisation rates” (p. 16). In the same spirit, Zhuravaskya (2000) 
argue that high equalization rates in Russia leave little incentive for sub-national authorities to 
exert tax-generating efforts when transfers increase. Buettner and Wildasin (2006) find that in 
the USA sub-national authorities lower own-revenue generation in response to an increase in 
external grants. Mogues et al. (2009) find that in Ghana, own-revenue generation of sub-
national authorities is negatively related to the level of past external transfers. 
Most of the previous literature deals with fiscal equalization and taxes passed at the local level. 
Our research, in contrast, focuses on de-centrally determined enforcement activities in a 
federation with a uniform tax law. We are aware of only two studies with a similar focus: a 
theoretical work by Traxler and Reutter (2008) and largely empirical work by Baretti et al. 
(2002). Neither of the two provides causal evidence on the interplay between 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇 / 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 and 
tax enforcement. With the present paper, we seek to fill this gap in the literature. 
In a general sense, the issue studied is not only relevant to federal countries, but also to unitary 
countries that have decentralized over the last decades. Also, it is relevant for (supra)national 
entities with transfer schemes but decentralized tax systems such as the European Union or the 
United States. Finally, even though the German constellation of a highly equalizing fiscal 
equalization scheme, a uniform tax law, and decentralized tax enforcement might be unique at 
present, historically the case of China prior to the tax sharing reform of 1994 is a quite perfect 
match for the same set of conditions, even though China was not then and is not currently a 
federal state.  
In sum, our major contribution is, that we provide causal evidence on the fiscal incentives of 
member states of a federation and identify significant effects, something that the literature has 
been lacking. The results of our examination are highly policy relevant: in the presence of 
incentive effects there are strong arguments in favor of centralized tax enforcement.   
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly introduces Germany’s 
federal system and income-tax law. Section 3 presents our theoretical model. Our database is 
described in Section 4. Section 5 provides the econometric analysis. Finally, Chapter 6 offers 
some concluding remarks. 
2 Fiscal Equalization and Taxation 
2.1 The basic mechanisms of fiscal equalization in Germany 
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Germany’s federal structure is reflected by three levels of governmental: the federal (Bund), the 
state (Bundesländer), and the local (Gemeinde) level. Since German reunification in 1990, 
sixteen Laender have comprised the state level and about 11,500 municipalities the local level. 
Germany’s federal system is cooperative: All the fiscally important taxes are set by the central 
government, and redistributive horizontal and vertical transfers are used to mitigate regional 
fiscal imbalances. As a result, the provision of (local) public goods and services is relatively 
similar across regions (Art. 107, Para. 2, 1, German Federal Constitution). 
Basically, the fiscal equalization system has four stages summarized in Table 1 and detailed in 
the Appendix. The first stage is the vertical assignment of tax revenue to the federal level and 
the states, with fixed shares assigned to each level. For example, 42.5% of the income tax 
revenue is assigned to the federal, and 57.5% to the state and local level. The stages 2 and 3 
determine the horizontal equalization. At these stages, tax revenue is distributed between rich 
and poor states, determined by the state specific “fiscal capacity” and “fiscal needs.” Basically, 
fiscal capacity is determined by tax return per inhabitant (before equalization), fiscal needs by 
average tax return per inhabitant across all of the 16 states: any increase in a state’s tax revenue 
either lowers the transfer entitlement (states with a below-average fiscal capacity) or increases 
the contribution obligation (states with an above-average fiscal capacity). Stage 4 determines 
particular vertical transfers from the federal to the state level.5 
In sum, Germany’s fiscal equalization system drives a substantial wedge between state tax 
revenues before and after fiscal equalization. As an example, at the margin, in case of the 
income tax, state-specific tax-back rates on state income tax revenues (𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇) are usually less 
than 25 percent. The remainder, the marginal rate of loss (1 − 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇), is redistributed 
horizontally or vertically (42.5%).  
 
Table 1 about here 
 
2.2 Determining the tax-back rates 
Due to the complexity of the legal regulations governing the fiscal equalization system, it is not 
feasible to express 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 by means of a simple closed form, say as a function of tax revenue, 
type of tax revenue, and number of inhabitants. All variations of these and other determinants 
are of relevance also in stages 2 to 4 of the transfer system (also Baretti et al., 2002, p. 646).6 
Official data on state-specific 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇s are not available. Hence, we have set up an accounting 
5 See Appendix Section 4 for details. 
6 Appendix 1 in Baretti et al. (2002) for details. 
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model that captures all the rules of Germany’s fiscal equalization law. The model is based on 
official statistics on the relevant information also used by the governmental institutions to assess 
the equalization transfers (tax revenue, population size, etc.) provided by the German Ministry 
of Finance. Based on this data, the model derives the actual horizontal and vertical transfer 
flows. The 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇s are determined by computing the change in a state’s actual tax revenue after 
fiscal equalization and in a hypothetical situation where the tax revenue before fiscal 
equalization is marginally increased – keeping everything else constant. 
The obtained 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇s for the years 1998, 2001, and 2004 are summarized in Table 2. The selection 
of the years is guided by the availability of the micro-level taxpayer data. Table 2 reveals several 
patterns. First, 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇s are quantitatively small, usually around 10-30 percent. Hence, the German 
states can internalize only a small fraction of marginal income tax revenue. This is because of 
the fixed proportion of tax revenue to be transferred to the central level, and the dependence of 
net transfer entitlements/obligations to fiscal capacity. Second, some states have a higher 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇s 
than others: As an example, in 2004, the 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 of North Rhine-Westphalia is 30 percent, 
compared to eight percent in Saarland. The reason is that the 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 increases with the absolute 
difference between a state’s fiscal capacity and average capacity over all 16 states. Third, 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 
usually exhibits very little inter-temporal variation. There is, however, a prominent exception: 
Schleswig-Holstein’s 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 drops from 57 percent in 1998 to twelve percent and then remains 
constant.7 This 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 discontinuity has a straight forward explanation: In 1998 Schleswig-
Holstein’s fiscal situation was such that its fiscal capacity was almost the same as the average 
fiscal capacity across all German states. This constellation implies that Schleswig Holstein’s 
horizontal net transfer was zero, and its 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 was determined solely by the initial assignment 
rule of the joint taxes (stage 1). This is the only constellation in which a state can experience a 
major swing in its 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇. Note, that this major swing occurred despite hardly any changes in 
Schleswig-Holstein’s per capita GDP (see Table A1). Instead, the swing occurred from a 
coincidence: that Schleswig Holstein’s fiscal capacity in 1998 was equal to the 16 states’ 
average. Another state with a sizeable change in 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 is Bavaria. Between 1998 and 2001, its 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 fell by more than four percentage points. In contrast to Schleswig Holstein, Bavaria’s GDP 
increased in the same period (see Table A1).  
The constancy of 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 in most states and its variability in two states means that the incentives 
for tax enforcement are constant over time in the former and change in the latter. This distinction 
7 The sharp fall of Schleswig-Holstein’s 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 from 1998 to 2001 is also documented in Lichtblau and Huber 
(2000). In contrast to the 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇, Lichtblau and Huber (2000) report marginal rates of loss, which corresponds to 1 − 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇. Simulations for marginal rate of loss instead of 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 are also provided in Bönke et al. (2011). 
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will serve as the basis for our treatment analysis. For a rigorous treatment analysis, it is 
important that the 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 is an exogenous variable that cannot be purposely influenced by the 
state governments or tax administrations. As we will explain below, this is the case. 
 
Table 2 about here 
 
The key variable that determines a state’s 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 is its fiscal capacity relative to the average 
capacity of all states. However, the relationship between a state’s 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 and its fiscal capacity is 
highly non-linear with several kinks. This is the first reason why the states cannot purposely 
influence 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇. For example, in 1998, the 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 of a “poor” net-recipient state like the Saarland 
and the “rich” net-contributor state Hamburg hardly differ. For “rich” states, 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇s are low 
because payment obligations increase sharply if tax revenue increases. For ‘poor’ states, 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇s 
are low because transfer entitlements are reduced sharply if tax revenue increases.8 As 
explained above, only when a state’s fiscal capacity is close to the average fiscal capacity of all 
sixteen states, its 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 high (about 57 percent) because then its horizontal net transfer position 
is zero, and its 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 is determined by the initial assignment rule of the joint taxes (stage 1).  
The second reason that makes it difficult to control 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 is that it usually requires sizeable 
variations in per capita tax revenue before fiscal equalization to change the 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇. The 
relationship between changes in a state’s per capita tax revenue before fiscal equalization and 
its 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 is depicted in Figures 1a-c. Each figure relates to one of the three observation periods 
1998, 2001, and 2004, and provides sixteen graphs, one for each state. An abscissa value of 
zero indicates a state’s actual fiscal situation, and the corresponding value on the ordinate its 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇. Negative (positive) values on the ordinate indicate hypothetical variations in the capita 
tax revenue before fiscal equalization (compared to the state’s actual situation; everything held 
constant). The graphs reveal that it usually requires substantial changes in per capita tax revenue 
before fiscal equalization to change 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇, and several kinks in the relationships even make it 
difficult to foresee the effect ex ante. There is always one peak in the 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇: it jumps to 57.5% 
if the state’s fiscal capacity complies with the average fiscal capacity over all states, meaning 
its horizontal net-transfer position is zero. 
The interpretation of 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 as an exogenous variable is further justified for the reason that the 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 of a particular year is always determined before the tax declarations for the same year are 
audited. This is because horizontal and vertical transfers in a particular year, say assessment 
8 Plachta (2008) provides a detailed description of the German financial constitution. 
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year 1998, hinge upon cash tax revenues. Income tax declarations from 1998, however, have 
been handled by the tax authorities since spring 1999. 
 
Figures 1a-1c about here 
 
2.3 The process of income taxation 
The legislation and the enforcement responsibility of the income tax (and the other joint taxes) 
are assigned to different governmental levels. The tax-setting authority is assigned to the federal 
government. It defines both tax tariffs and tax bases. The tax schedule is progressive: the 
average tax rate increases monotonically with increasing taxable income. During the period 
1998 to 2004, the marginal income tax rate, depending on the assessment year, ranged from 0% 
to 53%. The tax base, taxable income, is gross income minus numerous tax deductions and 
allowances. As the states have no tax-setting authority, even where “pure” state taxes are 
concerned,9 the states’ ability to control the income tax revenues directly are severely restricted. 
The responsibility for tax enforcement, however, is delegated to the states. 
The de-centralized enforcement of tax law at the state level and the monocracy of state financial 
executives open up opportunities for politically motivated application and interpretation of tax 
laws. This is because there are only basic standards in place to guide tax enforcement activities 
at the state level. Effectively, the state governments are free to decide on the funding of 
personnel and IT resources they will provide to their state tax agencies as well as on the training 
of tax agents. The state governments also give internal guidelines to their tax agents for how to 
deal with particularly vague paragraphs in the income tax law. Indeed, a report of the Federal 
Audit Office (2006, p. 78f.) remarks: “some states give the impression that the hiring of tax 
auditors is not interesting due to fiscal equalization; net contributor states had to pay the 
dominant part of eventual additional tax revenue in the fiscal equalization system, while 
transfers were reduced for the net recipient state.” In a summarizing statement in the same report 
it is argued that differences in the personnel endowments of tax offices10 undermine the 
“uniformity of taxation in Germany” (Federal Audit Office, 2006, p. 122). 
Further indications of politically motivated tax practices have been cited in previous literature: 
1. Vogel (2000, 128-155) as well as Schick (2011) find systematic differences in tax 
revenue per audit and state-specific tax auditing frequencies. The city state11 of 
Hamburg, for example, has a relatively high number of income millionaires whose 
9 Except the rate of the property acquisition tax that can be determined by the states since 2006.  
10 See Table A1 in the Appendix for details. 
11 Three German cities (Berlin, Bremen, Hamburg) are also independent federal states. 
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income tax returns are audited at a substantially lower rate than in other states 
(Schick, 2011). 
2. A report of the Federal Audit Office (2006, p. 13) documents that in a random 
sample of 21 tax offices the number of tax audits per tax agent and year varies 
between 972 and 2,720. It is also documented that the complete and equal auditing 
of tax declarations is no longer ensured, and that systematic errors are made in the 
audits of special expenses in Hamburg (p. 35f.). According to the Audit Office of 
Berlin (2001), tax returns of employees are not audited with sufficient care, and tax 
agents fail to examine tax declarations carefully in an effort to meet thresholds 
regarding the number of daily audits. 
3. To harmonize tax audits, recently a risk management system has been implemented 
in all tax offices across Germany. The system evaluates roughly 2,500 items on 
income tax returns and indicates potential incongruities between the items. 
Harmonization was not achieved because the states modified the detection 
algorithms independently, and because tax offices responded differently to potential 
incongruities (Federal Audit Office, 2009, p. 176-179; Federal Audit Office 2012, 
p. 30). If the system selects a tax return for special audit, it is not ensured that the 
auditing is conducted appropriately. Instead, according to several State Audit 
Offices, error rate range between 12 percent (North Rhine Westphalia) and 52 
percent (Brandenburg). 
4. Vogel (2000) provides evidence that some states treat certain tax payers by generous 
interpretation of amortization rules and the postponement of tax payments. 
In sum, the states bear the full costs of enforcing the income tax law (e.g., costs of operating 
state-level tax offices), but they internalize only part of the resulting tax revenues (due to the 
redistributive fiscal equalization scheme). The decentralization of administration results in 
limited means available to the federal government for controlling the tax collection process. 
The states therefore have both the opportunity and the incentive to align tax enforcement 
activities with their own objectives, and in this respect 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 may play a prominent role. As 
outlined above, several state-level indicators suggest differences in state-specific tax 
enforcement levels. However, the empirical evidence is basically anecdotal and also lacks a 
rigorous econometric testing. 
- 9 - 
 
3 A stylized model 
To understand the interplay between a de-centralized tax administration and transfer schemes 
in a federation with a uniform tax law, we have set up a static public good model in the spirit 
of Samuelson’s (1954). The model has strong assumptions but should be considered as a useful 
tool to introduce the empirical analysis. 
Consider a country with 𝑗𝑗 = 1, … , 𝐽𝐽 federal states and let a state 𝑗𝑗 have three sources of 
revenues: income tax revenue,12 equalizing grants, and lump sum transfers, feasible for the 
provision of a state-wide public good provided at the level 𝑔𝑔𝑗𝑗. Transfer rules determining the 
equalizing grants, 𝑍𝑍𝑗𝑗, and the lump sum transfers 𝑇𝑇�𝑗𝑗, and also the tax tariff, 𝜏𝜏, are set by a central 
planner (whose goal might be the maximization of overall societal welfare). These rules, 
characterized by �𝜏𝜏, �𝑍𝑍1, …𝑍𝑍𝐽𝐽�, �𝑇𝑇�1, …𝑇𝑇�𝐽𝐽��, are decided before taxes have actually been 
collected, and before public goods have been provided. Consistent with the situation in 
Germany we assume that tax enforcement is delegated to the federal states, which interpret 
�𝜏𝜏, �𝑍𝑍1, …𝑍𝑍𝐽𝐽�, �𝑇𝑇�1, …𝑇𝑇�𝐽𝐽�� as exogenous (henceforth indicated by vertical bars). We further 
assume that the tax units resident in a state 𝑗𝑗, 𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 = 1, … 𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗  , are immobile (and so are the incomes, 
tax bases).13 
Using the public good as the numéraire, in a static one-period model the public budget 
constraint of state 𝑗𝑗 is given by, 
 𝑔𝑔𝑗𝑗 ≤ 𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗 + 𝑍𝑍𝑗𝑗 + 𝑇𝑇�𝑗𝑗 , (1)  
with 
 
𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗 = � ?̅?𝑟𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗
𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗=1
∙ 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 �𝜏𝜏,𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 ,∆𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗�, (2)  
where 𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗 denotes income tax revenue after the initial assignment of taxes according to division 
rules in stage 1 of Germany’s fiscal equalization system. The term ?̅?𝑟 ≈ 0.575  gives the share 
from income tax revenue assigned to the state level (including the state’s municipalities),14 and 
𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 �𝜏𝜏,𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 ,∆𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗� is the effective tax burden imposed on tax unit 𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗. The effective tax burden of 𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 
12 We abstain from modeling other tax types or the possibility of public debt to keep the analysis simple. The 
reasons and incentives for raising public debt are discussed in Jochimsen and Nuscheler (2011). 
13 The assumption that citizens do not change residences across state borders in response to moderate differences 
in effective income tax rates is supported by a recent empirical study for Switzerland (see Liebig et al., 2007). 
Young and Varner (2011) verify this claim for one state in the USA. However, Kleven et al. (2013) find evidence 
of high mobility of top income earners across borders. Such top-income households are not contained in the micro-
data used in our empirical analysis. If tax units, however, are mobile, this offers another argument for the states to 
lower the effective tax rates. 
14 See Section 2.1 for details. 
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hinges on the progressive tax tariff, 𝜏𝜏,15 on 𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗’s gross taxable income,  𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗, and the level of 
granted deductions, ∆𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗. We assume that gross taxable income is exogenous from the tax agent’s 
point of view.  
The second term in the state’s budget constraint is the net equalizing transfers, 
𝑍𝑍𝑗𝑗 = 𝑍𝑍𝑗𝑗�(𝑇𝑇1(∙), 𝐼𝐼1), (𝑇𝑇2(∙), 𝐼𝐼2), … , �𝑇𝑇𝐽𝐽(∙), 𝐼𝐼𝐽𝐽�,𝐹𝐹� �. (3)  
For net-recipient (net-contributor) states, i.e., for states with a below-average (above-average) 
per capita fiscal capacity, the net equalizing transfer is positive (negative). 𝐹𝐹� accounts for 
further particular regulations inherent in Germany’s fiscal equalization system, i.e. the lump-




= 0. (4)  
The third term in the state’s budget constraint (1), 𝑇𝑇�𝑗𝑗 are lump sum vertical transfers, i.e., special 
needs grants. 
For a tax unit resident in state 𝑗𝑗, we assume that preferences are characterized by an additive 
utility function of the form, 
  𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 = 𝑓𝑓 �𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗� + ℎ�𝑔𝑔𝑗𝑗�, (5)  
with 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 denoting the level of a private good, the numéraire, and with 𝑔𝑔𝑗𝑗 denoting the level of a 
state-level public good. Accordingly, we abstain from modeling public good spillover effects. 
The budget constraint of a tax unit is, 
 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 ≤ 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 − 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 �𝜏𝜏̅,𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 ,∆𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗�. (6)  
Suppose �𝜏𝜏, �𝑍𝑍1, …𝑍𝑍𝐽𝐽�, �𝑇𝑇�1, …𝑇𝑇�𝐽𝐽�� and an interior solution exists. Further, suppose state 
planners “act as benevolent maximiser of their citizens’ welfare” (Edwards and Keen, 1995, p. 
113). Finally suppose the welfare of the residents of a state is described by a Bentham social 
welfare function, 𝑊𝑊𝑗𝑗 = ∑ 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝐼𝐼1𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗=1 .  
The optimization problem of the benevolent planner of a state 𝑗𝑗 is, 
 𝐿𝐿𝑗𝑗 �𝑔𝑔𝑗𝑗 ,∆1𝑗𝑗 , … ,∆𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗� =  (7)  
15 Mookherjee and Png (1990) address enforcement costs and optimal progressivity of income taxes. The present 
study takes the tax rate as given. 
Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 
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��𝑓𝑓 �𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 − 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 �𝜏𝜏,𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 ,∆𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗�� + ℎ�𝑔𝑔𝑗𝑗��𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗
𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗=1























𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗(∙) ∙ 𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗(∙)𝜕𝜕∆𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 �−1         ∀𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 = 1, … , 𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗 (8)  
 
⟺   𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗 ∙ 𝜕𝜕ℎ𝜕𝜕𝑔𝑔𝑗𝑗 ∗𝜕𝜕𝑓𝑓
𝜕𝜕𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗
= �?̅?𝑟 −� 𝜕𝜕𝑍𝑍𝑘𝑘
𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 �∙,∆𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗∗ �𝑘𝑘≠𝑗𝑗 �
−1          ∀𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 = 1, … , 𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗  
 
The benevolent planner of state 𝑗𝑗 chooses �∆𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗
∗ , … ,∆𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗∗ ,𝑔𝑔𝑗𝑗 ∗ � so that the optimality condition (8) 
holds. The optimality condition is a modification of the standard Samuelson condition for the 
provision of public goods.  
The left-hand side is the sum of rates of substitution between the public and the private good, 
known from the standard Samuelson condition. The expression in brackets on the right-hand 
side is the effect of a marginal variation of the tax base of resident 𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗, ∆𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗, on the public budget 
of state 𝑗𝑗: the internalized marginal tax revenue, 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗. The 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗  comprises two terms. The 
first term gives the additional tax revenue resulting from a marginal tax base variation that is 
not vertically redistributed: the product of the marginal tax rate, 𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 𝜕𝜕∆𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗� , times the income 
tax share assigned to the state level, ?̅?𝑟 ≈ 0.575. However, state 1 can internalize only part of 




𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗(∙) ∙ 𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗(∙)𝜕𝜕∆𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 > 0, constitutes a positive fiscal externality 
for the other 15 states. 
Notice that the concept of 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 = 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗 ∙ 𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗(∙)𝜕𝜕∆𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗  is related to the concept of the tax back rate, 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗 = ?̅?𝑟 − ∑ 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑘𝑘𝜕𝜕𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗𝑘𝑘≠𝑗𝑗  . However, this reflects that the internalized marginal return from a 
marginal expansion of the tax base (by granting fewer tax deductions to a tax unit, 𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗) depends 
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on both a state-level and a micro-level component: the state’s tax-back rate and the marginal 
tax rate of the taxpayer whose tax base is expanded. Hence, in the empirical analysis it is 
important to scrutinize the effect of 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗  on the level of granted deductions after conditioning 
for the tax payer-specific marginal tax rates. 
Equation (8) has immediate implications for the optimal level of deductions, ∆𝑗𝑗∗= ∑ ∆𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗∗𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗=1 , 
from the viewpoint of the benevolent planner in state 𝑗𝑗. Suppose there are two taxpayers with 
identical tax-relevant characteristics, i.e., identical marginal tax rates, living in two states 1 and 
2, taxpayers 11 and 12. Further suppose the states’ tax-back rates differ, 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇1 > 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇2. Under 
ceteris paribus conditions, condition (8) implies that then the level of tax deductions granted to 
taxpayer 11 should be lower than for taxpayer 12. This is because the internalized returns from 
tax enforcement are higher in state 1 than in state 2. For example, the states can control the 
effective tax burdens by deciding how many tax returns are audited, or through the ‘generosity’ 
of tax agents in granting of tax deductions. The argumentation requires that the substitution 
effect dominates the income effect.16 In any case, it is unlikely that substitution and income 
effects cancel each other out. 
Equation (8) also indicates that the state planner does not consider the effect of tax enforcement 
on the budgets of the other states: Every variation in granted tax deductions alters the state’s 
tax revenue ex ante to fiscal equalization, and thus alters the revenues of all other states. This 
fiscal externality implies an inefficient level of tax enforcement in terms of overall costs and 
benefits to society.  
The following empirical sections challenge equation (8) with empirical evidence. Except for a 
flat tax schedule, a rigorous empirical assessment requires tax-unit micro data. This is because 
individual marginal tax rates enter the optimality condition. 
 
4 Data and key figures 
4.1 Micro-level data 
Germany’s Income Tax Statistic (Lohn- und Einkommensteuerstatistik) provides income-tax 
returns from about 30 million tax units per assessment year. It conveys information on taxable 
income, family situation, income sources, granted deductions and exemptions, revenues and 
sources of revenues, income tax burden, etc. From all the tax units, a 10 percent stratified 
16 It must also be ensured that variations in discretionary deductions and corresponding changes in income tax 
revenues have at most a small effect on 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇. As Figures 1a-c indicated, this is not a too strong an assumption. As 
pointed out in Section 2.1, in the empirical examination, 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 are indeed exogenous.  
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random sample is made available for scientific purposes, the so-called Factually Anonymous 
Income Tax Statistic (Faktisch anonymisierte Lohn- und Einkommensteuerstatistik, FAST). As 
the amount of observations is rather high, at roughly 3 million tax units annually, we assume 
that the data are representative both for the national and for the state level. 
FAST is provided in form of three cross-sectional scientific use files covering data for the 
assessment years 1998, 2001, and 2004. These three cross-sections form our database. 
Unfortunately, more recent data are not available. This is for two reasons. First, tax units have 
an extensive period to file their income tax statements before the statements are audited and 
processed by the tax authority. For complex income tax statements the whole process can easily 
take up to five years. Second, once the tax collection process is completed, the data must be 
assembled by the state statistical offices and forwarded to the federal statistical office, where 
the scientific use files are prepared. 
FAST allows the identification of gross taxable income before any type of deductions (𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖) and 
taxable income. The difference between the two income concepts is the sum of all granted 
deductions (∆𝑖𝑖) and serves as the indicator of enforcement: the higher the granted deductions 
(∆𝑖𝑖), controlling for all tax relevant characteristics of the tax unit, the lower the level of 
enforcement.  
According to equation (8) from the theoretical model, the core variable for understanding the 
states’ incentives to tax is the internalized marginal return. Table 3 (columns 1-3) provides the 
respective state-wide averages, 𝑎𝑎𝑣𝑣𝑗𝑗 �𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗�.
17 The higher 𝑎𝑎𝑣𝑣𝑗𝑗 �𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗�, the higher the 
internalized revenue and the higher the incentive to ensure effective tax enforcement. As can 
be seen from Table 3, 𝑎𝑎𝑣𝑣𝑗𝑗 �𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗� differ substantially across states, ranging from 1.85 percent 
in 2004 in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania to 17.65 percent in Schleswig-Holstein in 1998. 
They also change over time. These differences arise for two main reasons. The first reason is 
state-specific tax-back rates. The second reason is differences in the state-specific distributions 
of tax-relevant characteristics (especially taxable income) and thus in the marginal tax rates. 
Table 3 (columns 4-6) provides the state-wide averages of marginal tax rates.18 Two patterns 
stand out. The first pattern is a decline in the averages of marginal tax rates over time. Most 
importantly, this decline is due to a lowering of the marginal tax rate of the top income bracket 
from 53 in 1998 to 45 percent in 2004. The second pattern is a difference in the period-specific 
17 The state- and period specific distributions of effective internalized marginal revenues (𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗) are provided in 
Figure A3a-c in the Appendix. 
18 Standard deviations of state-specific marginal tax rates can be found in Table A2 in the Appendix. 
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state-wide averages of the marginal tax rates: For example, in 1998 it ranges between 31.7 
percent in Hamburg and 25.6 percent in Saxony-Anhalt. 
 
Table 3 about here 
 
Further descriptive statistics of FAST variables used in the following regression analyses are 
summarized in Table A2 in the Appendix. By year and state, the table provides means and 
standard deviations of the gross taxable income before any deductions, 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗, and total deductions 
defined as the difference between gross taxable income and the actual fixed tax base, ∆𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗. All 
monetary amounts are expressed in 2004 prices. The table also gives the mean marginal tax 
rates and the number of weighted and non-weighted observations. Due to the factual 
anonymisation, information on the process of taxation and state of residency is incomplete for 
several tax units, particularly for very rich ones. These units had to be discarded from the 
database, leaving us with a pooled sample of roughly six million observations (two million per 
cross-section). 
Gross taxable income before any deductions is the central micro-level conditioning variable in 
the empirical analysis. It has a profound impact on the level of deductions, and it is exogenous 
from the viewpoint of states’ tax agents. Across the states, average gross taxable income is the 
highest for Baden-Wurttemberg and Hesse, and the lowest in Thuringia. Over time, average 
price adjusted gross taxable incomes varies little. 
The central endogenous variable in the empirical analysis is granted tax deductions. Average 
granted deductions for tax units in 1998, for example, range between €5,466 (Brandenburg) and 
€7,186 (Baden-Wurttemberg). It is not necessarily true, however, that deductions are higher in 
richer than in poorer states. As an example, in 2004, average gross taxable income in Bavaria 
was about €1,500 lower than in Hesse, but average deductions in Bavaria were about €140 
higher. 
The process of granting an income tax deduction usually has non-discretionary and a 
discretionary elements. Non-discretionary in the sense that some amount of deduction is granted 
lump sum and based on automatisms following well-defined legal terms: Once a specific 
requirement is met (e.g., having a tax-relevant child or paying church taxes), the deduction is 
granted. This leaves little room for the taxmen to “steer” income tax burdens. The discretionary 
element is due to vague legal terms. This leaves the taxmen some discretion concerning the 
interpretation of the case-relevant facts and thus the level of granted deductions. For example, 
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the level of expenses exceeding blanket allowances and qualified as deductible, despite some 
guidelines, is a decision ex aequo et bono of the auditing taxman.19 
 
4.2 Aggregated state-level data 
The basic idea of the state-level analysis is to explain the state-wide level of tax enforcement 
with state-specific tax incentives after controlling for a set of state characteristics. Tax 
enforcement is measured by an input variable: the staffing of tax administrations. This is 
defined as the number of income tax returns in a state divided by the number of full-time 
equivalent employees in the financial administration of the same state. The staffing of tax 
administrations is our proxy for the overall financial and human resources endowments of tax 
offices. 
The incentive to tax is captured by two variables. The first variable is the state-specific tax-
back rates, the 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇. The second variable it the average rate of internalized marginal revenues, 
𝑎𝑎𝑣𝑣(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇), as defined in Section 4.1. The set of state characteristics include real GDP per capita, 
the population density, and type of state (city-state [Hamburg, Bremen, and Berlin] vs. non-
city-state). 
Summary statistics on the staffing of tax administrations and the state characteristics are 
summarized in Table A1 in the Appendix. The staffing of tax administrations differs across 
states and varies over time. For example, in 1998 the ratio between the number of tax returns 
and full-time equivalent employees in the financial administration was about 226 in Lower 
Saxony compared with 110 and Bremen. Over time, the ratio increased: in 2004, it was 231 in 
Lower Saxony and 152 in Bremen. This is a common trend in all federal states. Real GDP per 
capita is much lower in Germany’s new (former East Germany) federal states than in the old 
(West German) states. It is highest in Hamburg (about € 50,000 in 2004), and lowest in 
Thuringia (about € 19,000 in 1998). Over time, real GDP changes little. The population density 
is highest in Berlin (>3,800 inhabitants per square kilometer) and lowest in Mecklenburg-
Western Pomerania (< 70 inhabitants per square kilometer), and exhibits some inter-temporal 
variation. 
 
5 Econometric results 
5.1 Analysis with state-level aggregates 
19 See Bönke et al. (2011) and references therein for details. 
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We start our analysis with a model using state-level aggregates in the spirit of studies such as 
Baretti et al (2002). The basic idea of these studies is to econometrically explain the state-wide 
level of tax enforcement by 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇, after controlling for other state-level variables. In particular, 
we measure tax enforcement by an input variable, the staffing of tax administrations: the state-
wide number of income tax returns divided by the number of full-time equivalent employees in 
the financial administration. The smaller the ratio, so the argument, the better the endowment 
of the tax administrations, and the higher the enforcement level. 
The state-level approach has two central weaknesses. First, economies of scale in tax 
administration are not well understood. In the presence of increasing returns to scale, highly 
populated states might enforce the tax law more effectively with the same staffing of tax 
administrations compared to less-populated states. Second, the approach does not control for 
differences in the distributions of individual 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇s across states (but uses a state-wide indicator). 
However, equation (8) indicates that the distribution of 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇s across a state’s tax-payers matters 
for tax enforcement. For these two reasons, results from a state-level regression approach 
should be viewed only as a preliminary naïve attempt to study the incentives of Germany’s 
federal system on the tax policies of the states. 
We implement two state-level panel regressions. In both regressions, the dependent variable is 
the inter-temporal change in the staffing of tax administrations. As staffing will respond to 
changes in tax enforcement incentives with some delay, the inter-temporal change in staffing 
in state 𝑗𝑗 is: ∆𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑔𝑔𝑗𝑗 = 𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑔𝑔𝑗𝑗,2004 − 𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑔𝑔𝑗𝑗,1998.20 The definition of all the 
explanatory variables follows the same logic. Hence, the state-level regression is, 
 ∆𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑔𝑔𝑗𝑗 =  𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1∆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗 + 𝛽𝛽2∆𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗 + 𝛽𝛽3∆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗 +  𝛽𝛽4𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑌𝑌𝑗𝑗 + 𝜀𝜀𝑗𝑗. (9)  
The change in tax enforcement incentives, ∆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗, is measured alternatively as (a) change 
in tax-back rates, ∆𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗 = 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗,2004 − 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗,1998 (specification S1.1); (b) change in average 
rate of internalized marginal revenues, ∆𝑎𝑎𝑣𝑣𝑗𝑗  (𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇) = 𝑎𝑎𝑣𝑣𝑗𝑗,2004 �𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗� − 𝑎𝑎𝑣𝑣𝑗𝑗,1998 �𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗� 
(specification S1.2). Our expectation is that 𝛽𝛽1 is positive.  
Control variables include the change in gross domestic product per capita, 𝛥𝛥𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗 , the change 
in population density per square kilometer, 𝛥𝛥𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗, and a city-state dummy, 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑌𝑌. We have 
included 𝛥𝛥𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗, because states whose gross domestic product increases relative to other states, 
in relative terms, increase their tax bases and the budget of their public sector. This should 
translate into a better staffing of the tax administrations. We have included ∆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗 for the reason 
20 The results for three-year differences support our findings from the six-year differences regarding the sign and 
magnitude of effects but are not significant at the 10 percent level.  
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that in states with a higher population density it is easier to achieve economies of scale and 
scope in tax administration. If  ∆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗 > 0, the ratio of the number of income tax returns and 
full-time equivalent employees should increase. Last, with the distinction between city-states 
and no-city-states, we seek to control for the peculiar characteristics of these cities: high 
population densities, short commuting distances, and particular population characteristics (e.g., 
age structure, dependence on social welfare and unemployment, migration background).  
The results of the two specifications are summarized in Table 4. In the first specification, the 
regression coefficient of ∆𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 carries the expected sign (a higher incentive for enforcing the 
tax law means that fewer taxpayers are audited per full-time employee in a state’s financial 
administration). However, the coefficient is insignificant. One possible explanation provides 
the optimality condition (8): tax enforcement depends on the tax back rate together with the 
distribution of individual marginal tax rates. Accordingly, tax-back rates alone are not an ideal 
indicator of a state’s incentive to enforce the tax law.21 Specification S1.2 considers the 
interaction of tax back rates and individual marginal tax rates by averaging the 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇s of all 
taxpayers in a state. Here, the regression coefficient pertaining ∆𝑎𝑎𝑣𝑣(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇) carries the expected 
negative sign and is significant at a 10 percent level.  
In sum, the results of the state-level approach do not reject our research hypothesis that higher 
internalized returns of taxation lead to higher tax enforcement activities at the state level. 
However, a state-level analysis misses the complexity of the condition (8): it is the distribution 
of 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇s over all the taxpayers in a state and not an average statistic that determines tax 
enforcement activities. Not controlling for differences in the distributions of the tax-relevant 
characteristics of the tax units in regression analysis could easily lead to spurious correlations. 
Considering the distributions of tax-relevant characteristics at the micro-level of tax units is 
thus crucial for estimating how fiscal equalization impacts tax enforcement activities of the 
states.22 This can be best achieved by conducting a micro-level analysis at the tax unit level.  
 
Table 4 about here 
 
 
5.2 Micro-level analysis 
21 This would to some extent explain the results in Baretti et al. (2002), who fail to find a robust link between the 
marginal rate of loss and the level of tax enforcement. 
22 Studies building on macro data instead proxy these and other issues with auxiliary variables such as an inequality 
index (e. g., Goodspeed, 2002). 
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On the micro level of the taxpayers, we perform two types of analysis. The first type rests on 
the observation that the state authorities’ incentives to tax differ between states and vary over 
time. In a nutshell, in line with the equation (8) from the theoretical model, we set up a cross-
sectional regression model with the level of tax enforcement, captured by the level of granted 
income tax deductions, as dependent variable, and incentives to tax, captured by the internalized 
marginal return, 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇, as the central explanatory variable. The second type is a treatment 
analysis. It rests on the observation that the incentives to tax, captured by 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇, exhibit little 
inter-temporal variation for most states but vary substantially in one state, namely Schleswig-
Holstein. Since 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 is an exogenous variable from the viewpoint of the states, the setting can 
be interpreted as a natural experiment and the residents of Schleswig-Holstein form the 
treatment group. 
 
5.2.1 Cross-sectional regressions 
The micro-level regression analysis is conducted with OLS. The dependent variable is the 
natural logarithm of the amount of tax deductions granted to an individual tax unit, i. 
Suppressing period, and state-level subscripts, the OLS regression is: 
 ln (∆𝑖𝑖) =  𝛼𝛼0 + 𝜷𝜷′𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝒔𝒔𝑰𝑰 + 𝜸𝜸′𝒀𝒀𝑰𝑰𝒀𝒀𝒀𝒀 + 𝜹𝜹′𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝒀𝒀𝒀𝒀𝑰𝑰 +  𝜽𝜽′𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝒀𝒀𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰+ 𝝑𝝑′(𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝒀𝒀𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰 ∙ 𝒀𝒀𝑰𝑰𝒀𝒀𝒀𝒀′) + 𝝁𝝁′𝑺𝑺𝑰𝑰𝒀𝒀𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖   (10)  
The bold expressions denote vectors. Error terms are clustered at the state level to correct for 
spatial correlation of error terms across countries. 𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝒔𝒔 includes a changing set of 
variables that mirror the tax enforcement incentives. Altogether four specifications are tested. 
In specification S2.1, 𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝒔𝒔  comprises a single variable: the taxpayer-specific 
internalized marginal tax revenue, 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇. The specification thus complies with the optimality 
condition (8) from the theoretical model. According to the model, we should expect a negative 
regression coefficient: The higher the incentive to enforce the tax law, the lower the granted tax 
deductions should be. Of course, to isolate the effect of 𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝒔𝒔 on granted tax deductions 
it is important to control for other potential determinants of granted tax deductions. To control 
for period effects, the vector 𝒀𝒀𝑰𝑰𝒀𝒀𝒀𝒀 includes two period dummies for 2001 and 2004. 𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝒀𝒀𝒀𝒀 
comprises the characteristics of the tax unit: the number of tax-relevant children, age, marital 
status and church membership. 𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝒀𝒀𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰 is a vector of seven dummies. Each dummy indicates 
whether the tax unit earned income from a particular income source. This is because the German 
income tax law distinguishes among seven different income sources, and for each, there are 
particular regulations. A dummy is one if the taxpayer has some positive income from the 
particular income source; otherwise it is zero. To capture changes in the tax law, we interact 
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the income source dummies with the two period dummies for 2001 and 2004. Finally, the vector 
𝑺𝑺𝑰𝑰𝒀𝒀𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰 comprises fifteen state dummies (base category is Baden-Wuerttemberg).23  
We perform three tests for the specification of the incentive variable, 𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝒔𝒔. First, in 
specification, S2.2, 𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝒔𝒔 is comprised of two variables: 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇 and the marginal tax rates 
of each taxpayer. This specification tests for the role of 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇 after controlling for individual 
marginal tax rates. Second, in specifications S2.3, 𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝒔𝒔 solely includes the state-
specific 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇s. Hence, S2.3 can be seen as the complement to the state-level approach in Section 
5.1 (Table 4, S.1.1). Third, in specification S2.4 𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝒔𝒔 decomposes the 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇 into the 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 and the individual marginal tax rate. Specification 2.4 is thus the most flexible 
specification, allowing 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 and marginal tax rates to having distinct effects on the level of 
granted tax deductions. 
Results from the four OLS regressions are summarized in Table 5. All four regression 
specifications tell the same consistent story: the higher the incentive to enforce the tax law, the 
lower the level of granted tax deductions is (controlling for all other aforementioned covariates). 
According to specification S2.1 the regression coefficient for 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇 equals -1.227. Assuming 
that average granted deduction amount to €6,000 (see Table A2), the coefficient indicates that 
raising the internalized tax revenue (𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇) by five percentage points lowers granted tax 
deduction by €360. According to specification S2.2, this inverse relationship between 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇 and 
tax deductions is confirmed even after additionally controlling for individual marginal tax rates. 
Specifications S2.3 and S2.4 show that both components of the 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇, 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 and marginal tax 
rates, matter for granted tax deductions, and that for both components the inverse relationship 
is again confirmed.  
 
Table 5 about here 
  
5.2.2 Treatment analysis 
The treatment analysis exploits the fact that incentives to tax change very little in most states 
but markedly in one state, Schleswig-Holstein. In this state, 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 was atypically high in 1998 
(of about 57 percent). Later it dropped to a usual level of about 12 percent in 2001 and 2004. 
Since 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 is exogenous for the state authorities, this can be used as a natural experiment in 
which the residents in Schleswig-Holstein form the treatment group and residents of other states 
with a similar 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 to Schleswig-Holstein in 1998/2001 form the control group. 
23 Most importantly, the state dummies control for unobserved state effects on dependent variable. For example 
the level of deductions may vary across states simply because of the composition of the state. 
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The econometric device to isolate the effect of the treatment is a difference-in-differences 
estimator (DiD). The DiD estimator is the difference between two differences: the difference in 
tax deductions before and after treatment among the treated, and the same difference among the 
controls. The control group should be composed of tax units resident in states with an inter-
temporally stable 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 with tax-relevant characteristics similar to the treated. The treatment in 
Schleswig-Holstein should lower the state’s incentive to tax because it lowers the share of a 
marginal tax euro that can be internalized. Accordingly, the DiD estimator should carry a 
positive sign.  
To establish experimental conditions, it is important to find adequate control states. By 
adequate, we mean that the 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 in the control states is constant over time and similar to that 
experienced by the treated state after treatment. Further, it is important that the tax units of the 
treatment and control states are comparable in terms of marginal tax returns. Otherwise, a 
uniform 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 does not guarantee an identical incentive to tax (see equation (8) in the model). 
As can be seen from Table 2, adequate control states are Lower Saxony and Rhineland 
Palatinate. To achieve comparability of tax units and to isolate the effect of 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇, we restrict 
our control and treatment groups to tax units in the top income bracket (𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 > 60.000 
respectively 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 > 120.000 for joint filers). This restriction further ensures that a fundamental 
change in the income tax tariff between 1998 and 2004 does not artificially alter the 
distributions of marginal tax rates within each state and prohibits us from constructing the 
appropriate treatment and control samples.24  
Suppressing individual, period, and state-level subscripts, we estimate the DiD for 1998/2001 
using OLS, 
 ln (∆) =  𝛼𝛼0 + 𝜷𝜷′𝑻𝑻𝒀𝒀𝑰𝑰𝒀𝒀𝑰𝑰 + 𝜸𝜸′𝒀𝒀𝑰𝑰𝒀𝒀𝒀𝒀 + 𝜹𝜹′𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝒀𝒀𝒀𝒀 +  𝜽𝜽′𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝒀𝒀𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰 + 𝝁𝝁′𝑺𝑺𝑰𝑰𝒀𝒀𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰 + 𝜀𝜀  (11)  
The notation is the same as in equation (8). The variable 𝑻𝑻𝒀𝒀𝑰𝑰𝒀𝒀𝑰𝑰 is a dummy. The dummy is 
zero for all observations in 1998. For 2001, it is zero for residents of the control states and one 
for the residents of Schleswig Holstein. 
We performed three types of robustness checks. First, to test whether the DiD is not just picking 
up a time effect, we ran the DiD again for Schleswig-Holstein for the period 2001/4 when its 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 was constant. Presumably we should find no effect. Second, we performed pseudo-
treatments as a quasi-falsification test. Pseudo-treated states are states with a constant 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇. For 
these states we ran the DiD against other states with a constant and similar 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇. The main goal 
of the two tests is to rule out other state specific confounding policies that occur at the same 
24 Between 1998 and 2004, the top marginal tax rate was lowered from 53 to 45 percent. This, however, should be 
captured by a common time trend and poses no problem. 
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time as the 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 change. Finally, we ran all the DiD models after having reproduced the tax 
characteristics of the treated in the control groups with statistical matching. Because our 
analysis relies on repeated cross-sections, we implemented the statistical matching across three 
groups: the treated and the non-treated in the initial period before treatment, and the non-treated 
after treatment (Blundell and Costa-Dias, 2008, p. 58). Further information on the statistical 
matching and additional robustness checks can be found in Appendix, Section 2. 
 
Table 6 about here 
 
All the difference-in-differences estimators are summarized in Table 6. Altogether, the Table 
comprises six panels. In each panel, we report, from left to right, four estimators: the first two 
estimators relate to the period 1998/2001 from OLS and OLS after matching. The last two 
estimators relate to the period 2001/4.  
Results for Schleswig-Holstein appear in the first panel. For the period 1998/2001, we find a 
positive and significant treatment effect both for OLS and OLS after matching that meets the 
prediction of our theoretical model: The drop in Schleswig Holstein’s 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 from 57.05 to 12.15 
percent lowered the incentives to tax, and this implies a higher level of granted tax deductions. 
The average treatment effect of the treated (att) amounts to € 205 for the simple OLS and to 
€410 for OLS after matching. Alone for the rich tax payers in Schleswig Holstein, the results 
from OLS/match indicate forgone tax revenues of 10.2 million Euro. The difference in the 
estimates is due to the higher average gross income of residents in the control states before 
matching (see Table A3a). For the period 2001/4 when Schleswig-Holstein’s 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 remained 
stable, we find no significant effect. This can be viewed as supporting evidence that the DiD is 
not just picking up a time effect. 
Results for the marginal treatment (Bavaria) and the pseudo-treatments are assembled in panels 
2-6. In panel 2, we provide the treatment effects for the constellation Bavaria against the control 
states Baden-Wurttemberg and Hesse. Bavaria’s 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 drops slightly by about four percentage 
points between 1998 and 2001 and hardly differs between 2001 and 2004. Like Bavaria, both 
controls are net-contributor non-city-states. Their 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 is constant over time, and comparable 
with Bavaria’s 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 in 2001/4. Hence, we should expect a mild positive treatment effect 
between 1998/2001 and no effect between 2001/4. The results for 1998/2001 meet the 
expectation: the average treatment effect of the treated is €140 / €222 for the simple OLS / OLS 
after matching, amounting to 35.7 million Euro at the state level. In quantitative terms, the per 
capita effect is about half the size of the 1998/2001 effect for Schleswig Holstein. The results 
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for 2001/2004, contrary to our expectations, indicate a negative treatment effect. However, it is 
small in quantitative terms and insignificant at the one percent level. 
In panels 3-6, we provide results for four further pseudo treatments. In all the constellations 
both the pseudo-treated state and the control states have a similar 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇. Further, it is guaranteed 
that the 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇s exhibit very little inter-temporal variation. The first constellation is Brandenburg, 
one of Germany’s “new” states, against the “new” states of Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, 
Saxony-Anhalt, and Thuringia. In the three subsequent constellations we assigned Brandenburg 
to the control states and always changed the status of one control state from control to treated. 
For all constellations, 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 remained stable, we expect to find no significant effect. Indeed, 10 
out of the 16 treatment effects are insignificant. If Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania or 
Thuringia has the status of being treated, none of the effects is significant at the five percent 
level. Only for the constellation with Brandenburg as pseudo-treated state, are the results at 
odds with our expectations: Here we find sizeable and significant positive treatment effects. 
Only possible explanation is Brandenburg’s proximity to Berlin: in contrast to the other 
considered “new” states that experienced a substantial inter-temporal decline in their 
populations, Brandenburg’s population remained stable overall (see Table A1). In the same 
time, the staffing of Brandenburg’s tax administrations deteriorated, also in comparison with 
the other “new” states under consideration: As can be seen from Table A1 in the Appendix, the 
ratio full-time employees in the tax administration to the total number of income tax returns 
rose from 172 in 1998 to 247 in 2004. It is not unlikely that this decline in staffing is driving 
the positive treatment effect for Brandenburg. 
In sum, our empirical analysis suggests that a uniform income tax law de jure does not 
necessarily guarantee uniform enforcement of the law de facto. In Germany, it is the federal 
states that are responsible for the enforcement of the law. Our analysis reveals that the 
enforcement of the law, as measured by the level of income tax deductions granted, differs 
across states. The design of Germany’s federal system offers a reasonable explanation. The 
system implies substantial differences in the state-specific marginal tax-back rates. As a result, 
some states can internalize a larger share of an additional tax euro than others, i.e., incentive to 
tax differ between states. The pooled cross-sectional regressions revealed that the level of 
granted tax deductions hinges on the share of tax revenue a state can internalize. The treatment 
analysis reveals that the states adjust the administration of the income tax to changes in 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇. 
Our prototype case, Schleswig-Holstein, experienced a substantial decrease in its 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇. 
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Compared with the control states, this decrease translated into a significant increase in the level 
of granted income tax deductions.25 
 
6 Conclusion 
In many federations, fiscal equalization schemes have been created to mitigate fiscal 
imbalances across the member states. Various theoretical works have investigated the 
incentives of such cooperative systems. However, so far only a few studies have addressed the 
research question of the present paper: whether fiscal equalization affect the enforcement of a 
uniform tax by state governments. 
By means of a stylized model, we show that state authorities have incentives to align the 
effective tax rates of their residents to the internalized marginal returns from taxation. We 
empirically test the model using two approaches: regression analysis and a natural experimental 
design, and our estimates support the model’s prediction: states with a higher internalized share 
of marginal tax revenues exploit the tax bases to a higher extent via the instrument of granting 
lower tax deductions. 
From the viewpoint of a single state it is rational to align tax enforcement activities with the 
fraction of additional tax revenue that the state internalizes. However, the alignment causes 
fiscal externalities, and these imply that state-specific tax enforcement activities are inefficient 
(too low) from the viewpoint of the overall economy. Further, differences in enforcement 
activity across the states violate the principle of equal treatment of equals, undermining the tax 
morality of taxpayers. 
In principle, such problems can be rectified by shifting the tax enforcement responsibility to a 
central tax agency. Indeed, several initiatives in this direction have been made in Germany in 
recent years. For example, in 2007 a commission of German experts on federalism 
(“Föderalismuskommission II”) discussed the installation of such an agency. In the past, 
however, such initiatives have always been abandoned, or failed due to the resistance of German 
states. 
  
25 It would be interesting to complement our micro econometric analysis with alternative measures of enforcement, 
i.e., the probability of audits, the level fines applied to taxpayers, or the difference between declared and granted 
tax deductions. However, the data do not offer the requested information.  
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Table 1. Germany’s fiscal equalization system  










Revenue sharing of 
joint taxes (income, 
corporation, VAT) 







financially strong states 
(above average joint-
tax-revenues) to 
financially weak ones 
(below average) 
Transfers from the 
federal government 
to states whose 
fiscal revenue is 
still below average 
Fiscal 
effect 
Fixed rate of loss for 
provinces, e.g. 42.5% 
for income tax re-
venue, i.e. they keep 
57.5% of income tax 
revenue. 
All states 
receive at least 
92% of average 
(per capita) tax 
revenue 
All states receive at 
least 95% of average 
(per capita) fiscal 
revenue 
 
All states receive at 
least 99.5% of 
average (per capita) 
fiscal revenue 
Note. In addition to stage 1 to 4 some provinces receive special need grants that are paid lump-sum. 
 
 
Table 2. Tax back rates 
 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 (in %) 
State Acronym 1998 2001 2004 
Baden-Wurttemberg BW 21.12 21.98 22.45 
Bavaria BV 26.59 22.34 23.37 
Berlin BE 10.19 10.16 10.16 
Brandenburg BB 9.02 9.03 9.01 
Bremen HB 8.39 8.38 8.38 
Hamburg HH 8.80 8.50 17.08 
Hesse HE 19.20 20.08 19.41 
Lower Saxony  NI 14.97 12.19 12.83 
Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania MV 8.56 8.54 8.51 
North Rhine-Westphalia  NW 29.07 29.63 29.46 
Rhineland-Palatine RP 12.84 12.83 12.84 
Saarland SL 8.14 8.13 8.12 
Saxony SN 10.17 10.1 10.04 
Saxony-Anhalt ST 9.09 9.03 8.97 
Schleswig-Holstein  SH 57.05 12.15 12.16 
Thuringia TH 8.96 8.92 8.89 
Note. Own calculations. 
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Table 3. Average state level internalized marginal tax revenues 
 
𝑎𝑎𝑣𝑣𝑗𝑗(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗) (in %) 𝑎𝑎𝑣𝑣 �𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗(∙)𝜕𝜕∆𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 � (in %) 
State Acronym 1998 2001 2004 1998 2001 2004 
Baden-Wurttemberg BW 6.66 6.18 6.09 31.5 28.1 27.1 
Bavaria BV 8.21 6.16 6.19 30.9 27.5 26.4 
Berlin BE 3.13 2.74 2.54 30.8 26.8 24.9 
Brandenburg BB 2.44 2.12 2.06 26.9 23.4 22.9 
Bremen HB 2.57 2.25 2.13 30.5 26.8 24.5 
Hamburg HH 2.81 2.40 4.57 31.7 28.0 26.6 
Hesse  HE 6.03 5.63 5.20 31.3 28.0 26.7 
Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania MV 2.24 1.92 1.85 26.0 22.5 21.5 
Lower Saxony NI 4.49 3.26 3.33 30.1 26.7 25.8 
North Rhine-Westphalia  NW 9.03 8.17 7.81 31.0 27.5 26.5 
Rhineland-Palatine RP 3.93 3.49 3.37 30.7 27.0 26.1 
Saarland SL 2.46 2.20 2.12 30.3 26.9 25.6 
Saxony SN 2.66 2.26 2.17 26.2 22.2 21.7 
Saxony-Anhalt ST 2.35 2.01 1.95 25.6 22.1 21.6 
Schleswig-Holstein  SH 17.65 3.32 3.18 31.0 27.3 26.1 
Thuringia TH 2.32 2.00 1.95 25.8 22.4 21.8 
Note. The average marginal tax revenue is calculated as the state specific average marginal tax rate multiplied with one 




Table 4. State level regression 
Specification S1.1 S1.2 
Dependent variable: 𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥 
𝛥𝛥𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 -71.323 (42.290)   
𝛥𝛥𝑎𝑎𝑣𝑣(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇)    -244.987* (136.323) 
𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥  0.012** (0.004) 0.012** (0.004) 
𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥 0.071 (0.324) 0.047 (0.320) 
𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶 33.265** (11.857) 33.975** (11.766) 
𝐶𝐶𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝛥𝛥𝑡𝑡 46.673*** (7.142) 44.614*** (7.571) 
R2 0.382  0.399  
F statistic 3.318  3.487  
Observations 16  16  
Note. Ordinary least squares regression, standard errors in parentheses. Levels of significance: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. All 
variables denoted with 𝛥𝛥 are calculated as difference between 1998 and 2004. Underlying values for the variables are provided 
in Table 2 (𝛥𝛥𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇), Table 3 (𝛥𝛥𝑎𝑎𝑣𝑣(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇)) and Table A1 (𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥: difference in relative staffing; 𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥: difference in per 
capita GDP; 𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥: difference in population density) in the Appendix. Data. Federal Statistical Office, Income Tax Statistics, 
Own Calculation. 
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Table 5. Regression results 
Specification S2.1 S2.2 S2.3 S2.4 
Dependent variable: 𝑙𝑙𝛥𝛥(∆𝑖𝑖) 
𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇 -1.227*** (0.015) -0.167*** (0.017)     
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇     -0.036*** (0.007) -0.033*** (0.007) 
𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 𝜕𝜕∆𝑖𝑖⁄    -0.798*** (0.006)   -0.827*** (0.006) 
𝒀𝒀𝑰𝑰𝒀𝒀𝒀𝒀 
𝐶𝐶𝑦𝑦𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟2001 -0.100*** (0.003) -0.113*** (0.003) -0.089*** (0.003) -0.113*** (0.003) 
𝐶𝐶𝑦𝑦𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟2004 -0.293*** (0.003) -0.312*** (0.003) -0.283*** (0.003) -0.312*** (0.003) 
𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝒀𝒀𝒀𝒀 
𝑙𝑙𝛥𝛥(𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖) 0.624*** (0.001) 0.709*** (0.001) 0.593*** (0.000) 0.709*** (0.001) 
𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑦𝑦𝛥𝛥 0.255*** (0.000) 0.256*** (0.000) 0.256*** (0.000) 0.256*** (0.000) 
𝑎𝑎𝛥𝛥𝑦𝑦 0.103*** (0.000) 0.103*** (0.000) 0.103*** (0.000) 0.103*** (0.000) 
𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 0.131*** (0.001) 0.074*** (0.001) 0.073*** (0.001) 0.073*** (0.001) 
𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑢𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐ℎ 0.138*** (0.001) 0.140*** (0.001) 0.139*** (0.001) 0.139*** (0.001) 
𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝒀𝒀𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰 
𝑎𝑎𝛥𝛥𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡𝑢𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑦𝑦/ 𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝑟𝑟𝑦𝑦𝛥𝛥𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝐶𝐶 0.549*** (0.003) 0.544*** (0.003) 0.547*** (0.003) 0.544*** (0.003) 
𝑏𝑏𝑢𝑢𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖𝛥𝛥𝑦𝑦𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥 0.181*** (0.002) 0.184*** (0.002) 0.178*** (0.002) 0.183*** (0.002) 
𝛥𝛥𝑦𝑦𝑙𝑙𝛥𝛥 𝑦𝑦𝑚𝑚𝛥𝛥𝑙𝑙𝛥𝛥𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑦𝛥𝛥𝑡𝑡 0.250*** (0.002) 0.256*** (0.002) 0.245*** (0.002) 0.256*** (0.002) 
𝑦𝑦𝑚𝑚𝛥𝛥𝑙𝑙𝛥𝛥𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑦𝛥𝛥𝑡𝑡 0.134*** (0.002) 0.139*** (0.002) 0.131*** (0.002) 0.139*** (0.002) 
i𝛥𝛥𝑣𝑣𝑦𝑦𝛥𝛥𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑦𝛥𝛥𝑡𝑡 0.161*** (0.002) 0.165*** (0.002) 0.155*** (0.002) 0.165*** (0.002) 
𝑟𝑟𝑦𝑦𝛥𝛥𝑡𝑡/ 𝑙𝑙𝑦𝑦𝑎𝑎𝛥𝛥𝑦𝑦 0.089*** (0.002) 0.091*** (0.002) 0.085*** (0.002) 0.090*** (0.002) 
𝛥𝛥𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑦𝑦𝑟𝑟 0.208*** (0.002) 0.198*** (0.002) 0.214*** (0.002) 0.198*** (0.002) 
𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝒀𝒀𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰 ∙ 𝐶𝐶𝑦𝑦𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟2001 
𝑎𝑎𝛥𝛥𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡𝑢𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑦𝑦/ 𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝑟𝑟𝑦𝑦𝛥𝛥𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝐶𝐶 -0.061*** (0.004) -0.055*** (0.004) -0.051*** (0.004) -0.054*** (0.004) 
𝑏𝑏𝑢𝑢𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖𝛥𝛥𝑦𝑦𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥 0.016*** (0.002) 0.013*** (0.002) 0.020*** (0.002) 0.013*** (0.002) 
𝛥𝛥𝑦𝑦𝑙𝑙𝛥𝛥 𝑦𝑦𝑚𝑚𝛥𝛥𝑙𝑙𝛥𝛥𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑦𝛥𝛥𝑡𝑡 -0.020*** (0.003) -0.022*** (0.003) -0.014*** (0.003) -0.022*** (0.003) 
𝑦𝑦𝑚𝑚𝛥𝛥𝑙𝑙𝛥𝛥𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑦𝛥𝛥𝑡𝑡 -0.072*** (0.002) -0.076*** (0.002) -0.067*** (0.002) -0.075*** (0.002) 
i𝛥𝛥𝑣𝑣𝑦𝑦𝛥𝛥𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑦𝛥𝛥𝑡𝑡 -0.089*** (0.002) -0.089*** (0.002) -0.084*** (0.002) -0.089*** (0.002) 
𝑟𝑟𝑦𝑦𝛥𝛥𝑡𝑡/ 𝑙𝑙𝑦𝑦𝑎𝑎𝛥𝛥𝑦𝑦 -0.021*** (0.002) -0.018*** (0.002) -0.017*** (0.002) -0.018*** (0.002) 
𝛥𝛥𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑦𝑦𝑟𝑟 0.077*** (0.002) 0.074*** (0.002) 0.075*** (0.002) 0.074*** (0.002) 
𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝒀𝒀𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰 ∙  𝐶𝐶𝑦𝑦𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟2004 
𝑎𝑎𝛥𝛥𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡𝑢𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑦𝑦/ 𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝑟𝑟𝑦𝑦𝛥𝛥𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝐶𝐶 0.005 (0.004) 0.010** (0.004) 0.015*** (0.004) 0.011** (0.004) 
𝑏𝑏𝑢𝑢𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖𝛥𝛥𝑦𝑦𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥 -0.041*** (0.002) -0.047*** (0.002) -0.036*** (0.003) -0.046*** (0.002) 
𝛥𝛥𝑦𝑦𝑙𝑙𝛥𝛥 𝑦𝑦𝑚𝑚𝛥𝛥𝑙𝑙𝛥𝛥𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑦𝛥𝛥𝑡𝑡 0.006** (0.003) -0.002 (0.003) 0.013*** (0.003) -0.001 (0.003) 
𝑦𝑦𝑚𝑚𝛥𝛥𝑙𝑙𝛥𝛥𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑦𝛥𝛥𝑡𝑡 0.043*** (0.003) 0.036*** (0.003) 0.048*** (0.003) 0.037*** (0.003) 
i𝛥𝛥𝑣𝑣𝑦𝑦𝛥𝛥𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑦𝛥𝛥𝑡𝑡 -0.049*** (0.003) -0.053*** (0.003) -0.042*** (0.003) -0.052*** (0.003) 
𝑟𝑟𝑦𝑦𝛥𝛥𝑡𝑡/ 𝑙𝑙𝑦𝑦𝑎𝑎𝛥𝛥𝑦𝑦 0.037*** (0.002) 0.038*** (0.002) 0.041*** (0.002) 0.039*** (0.002) 
𝛥𝛥𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑦𝑦𝑟𝑟 0.170*** (0.002) 0.167*** (0.002) 0.169*** (0.002) 0.167*** (0.002) 
𝑺𝑺𝑰𝑰𝒀𝒀𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 -0.024*** (0.002) -0.047*** (0.002) -0.047*** (0.002) -0.049*** (0.002) 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 -0.127*** (0.002) -0.095*** (0.002) -0.092*** (0.002) -0.093*** (0.002) 
𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼 -0.123*** (0.002) -0.100*** (0.002) -0.095*** (0.002) -0.098*** (0.002) 
𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇 -0.138*** (0.003) -0.103*** (0.003) -0.100*** (0.003) -0.102*** (0.003) 
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 -0.069*** (0.001) -0.094*** (0.001) -0.095*** (0.001) -0.096*** (0.001) 
𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻 -0.064*** (0.002) -0.057*** (0.002) -0.056*** (0.002) -0.057*** (0.002) 
𝑇𝑇𝛥𝛥 -0.075*** (0.002) -0.050*** (0.002) -0.047*** (0.002) -0.048*** (0.002) 
𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵 0.023*** (0.001) 0.014*** (0.001) 0.015*** (0.001) 0.014*** (0.001) 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 -0.100*** (0.002) -0.066*** (0.003) -0.061*** (0.003) -0.064*** (0.003) 
𝑇𝑇𝐻𝐻 -0.150*** (0.002) -0.120*** (0.002) -0.116*** (0.002) -0.118*** (0.002) 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 -0.061*** (0.002) -0.033*** (0.002) -0.027*** (0.002) -0.032*** (0.002) 
𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀 -0.034*** (0.002) -0.005** (0.002) 0.001 (0.002) -0.005** (0.002) 
𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁 0.012*** (0.002) 0.038*** (0.002) 0.044*** (0.002) 0.038*** (0.002) 
𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇 -0.056*** (0.002) -0.029*** (0.002) -0.023*** (0.002) -0.029*** (0.002) 
𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆 0.023*** (0.002) 0.050*** (0.002) 0.057*** (0.002) 0.051*** (0.002) 
𝐶𝐶𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝛥𝛥𝑡𝑡 1.324*** (0.005) 0.670*** (0.007) 1.555*** (0.005) 0.643*** (0.009) 
R2 0.559  0.561  0.559  0.561  
F statistic 186,735.8  185,765.7  185,068.3  185,713.8  
Observations 5,990,667  5,990,667  5,990,667  5,990,667  
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Levels of significance: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. Data. FAST 1998-2004. 
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Table 6. Average treatment effects of the treated (att) 
State 
(treatment group) Control group 
Treatment period 
1998/2001 2001/2004 
OLS OLS/ matching OLS OLS/ matching 






















































Note. Levels of significance: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%, robust standard errors in parentheses. Control groups are subject to similar 
a 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 experienced by the treatment group after treatment. Sample consists of “rich” tax units with gross taxable income in the 
top income bracket (𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 > 60.000 respectively 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 > 120.000 for joint filers) only. Full regression results provided in Tables 
A4a-f in Appendix Section 3. Data. FAST 1998-2004. 
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Figure 1a. Tax-back rate and income tax revenue, 1998 
 


























































































































































variation of income tax revenue per capita (in Euro)
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Figure 1b. Tax-back rate and income tax revenue, 2001 
 


























































































































































variation of income tax revenue per capita (in Euro)
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Figure 1c. Tax-back rate and income tax revenue, 2004 
 




























































































































































variation of income tax revenue per capita (in Euro)
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Fiscal federalism and tax enforcement 




The Appendix is subdivided into four sections. The first section provides information on the data: 
The second section provides information on the statistical matching procedure and the quality of the 
matching. The third section provides details on the DID regressions provided in Section 5 of the main 
body of the paper. The fourth section provides details on the accounting model of the German fiscal-
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Section 1: Information on the data 
 
Our empirical analysis relies on two types of data: aggregated state-level data and micro data on 
income tax units. Our state-level data comes from the Federal Statistical Office. Table A1 provides 
the state-level indicators entering into the state-level regressions (Section 5.1): the number of income 
tax returns divided by the number of full-time equivalent employees in a state’s financial 
administration (staffing of financial administration); per capita GDP in 2004 prices; the population 
density per square kilometer. 
 
Table A1. State-level indicators 
State Staffing of financial administration Per capita GDP Population density (per km2) 
 1998 2001 2004 1998 2001 2004 1998 2001 2004 
BW 208.76 232.11 284.07 32,023 33,406 32,805 291.62 296.51 299.77 
BY 222.51 243.83 285.19 32,767 34,290 34,631 171.32 174.76 176.38 
BE 110.51 120.63 152.22 27,171 26,569 25,178 3828.80 3817.09 3816.41 
BB 172.05 188.95 246.748 19,288 20,273 20,667 87.86 87.95 87.09 
HB 109.86 174.47 240.40 37,908 39,421 40,197 1593.28 1573.44 1581.94 
HH 105.92 143.14 187.02 48,985 50,646 50,171 2251.30 2286.09 2297.30 
HE 210.79 245.35 287.79 34,006 35,672 35,873 285.82 287.84 288.79 
MV 164.04 179.73 230.15 19,189 19,931 20,344 77.56 75.89 74.15 
NI 226.13 230.89 280.30 26,009 26,151 25,707 165.20 167.11 168.04 
NW 213.12 227.86 275.25 29,212 29,274 29,364 527.26 529.51 530.19 
RP 210.64 226.17 258.88 25,653 25,729 26,174 202.73 203.94 204.55 
SR 188.18 170.46 237.93 26,275 26,983 27,743 418.19 415.17 411.26 
SN 156.55 184.92 230.43 19,561 20,381 21,896 243.73 238.02 233.25 
ST 182.47 191.38 222.32 18,726 19,511 20,775 130.78 126.19 121.98 
SH 221.51 227.03 292.33 26,832 27,121 26,229 175.07 177.49 179.04 
TH 157.60 177.55 222.87 18,610 19,771 20,830 152.28 149.10 145.63 
Note. Data from German’s Federal Statistical Office. See Table 3 for the definition of the state acronyms. 
 
 
Our micro data base is the German Factually Anonymous Income Tax Statistic (Faktisch 
anonymisierte Lohn- und Einkommensteuerstatistik, FAST), a stratified 10 percent random sample of 
the Income Tax Statistic (Lohn- und Einkommensteuerstatistik). It is an administrative database 
provided by the Federal Statistical Office, available for the assessment years 1998, 2001, and 2004.  
 
Table A2 provides non-weighted sample statistics of the FAST tax units entering the cross-sectional 
analysis in Section 5.2.1. For every federal state and period, the table provides the number of 
observations and descriptive statistics (mean, standard deviations) of three central variables of our 
empirical analysis: gross taxable income, granted tax deductions, and marginal tax rate.  
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Table A2. Sample statistics 
State Gross taxable income Tax deductions Marginal tax rate Number of observations 
𝑗𝑗 𝑎𝑎𝑣𝑣𝑗𝑗 �𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗� 𝑎𝑎𝑣𝑣𝑗𝑗 �∆𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗� 𝑎𝑎𝑣𝑣𝑗𝑗 �𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 𝜕𝜕∆𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗� � 𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗 
 1998 2001 2004 1998 2001 2004 1998 2001 2004 1998 2001 2004 
SH 34,344 34,606 34,367 6,163 5,440 5,472 0.310 0.273 0.261 878,828 903,132 854,272 
(25,390) (26,147) (25,316) (9,739) (8,094) (7,622) (0.125) (0.118) (0.119) (110,474) (107,632) (77,594) 
HH 34,651 35,167 34,510 5,836 5,443 5,397 0.317 0.280 0.266 548,603 570,559 528,053 
(28,227) (28,838) (27,568) (11,916) (9,398) (9,350) (0.142) (0.132) (0.132) (91,902) (90,759) (65,226) 
NI 32,976 33,800 33,705 5,927 5,361 5,283 0.301 0.267 0.258 2,474,700 2,479,352 2,337,241 
(25,182) (25,263) (24,375) (10,746) (7,689) (7,097) (0.129) (0.120) (0.118) (191,631) (192,710) (135,470) 
HB 32,383 32,944 30,847 5,615 5,087 4,809 0.305 0.268 0.245 178,317 191,403 181,383 
(24,402) (25,489) (24,341) (8,137) (7,278) (7,108) (0.135) (0.127) (0.131) (46,499) (44,400) (32,636) 
NW 34,687 35,382 35,148 6,074 5,484 5,479 0.310 0.275 0.265 5,679,807 5,689,523 5,380,788 
(25,658) (26,321) (25,358) (10,053) (7,816) (7,173) (0.129) (0.121) (0.120) (299,115) (335,094) (255,416) 
HE 35,623 36,817 36,124 6,619 5,877 5,775 0.313 0.280 0.267 1,992,821 2,033,802 1,950,343 
(27,509) (28,236) (27,095) (11,646) (8,694) (8,216) (0.137) (0.126) (0.126) (180,180) (194,493) (143,737) 
RP 33,920 34,340 34,188 6,254 5,521 5,383 0.307 0.270 0.261 1,271,695 1,315,679 1,266,083 
(24,488) (25,336) (24,449) (9,090) (7,528) (6,884) (0.125) (0.118) (0.118) (132,092) (130,962) (95,025) 
BW 36,100 36,986 36,614 7,186 6,241 6,036 0.315 0.281 0.271 3,400,128 3,551,120 3,435,706 
(26,851) (27,235) (26,225) (11,493) (8,475) (7,281) (0.133) (0.123) (0.123) (230,061) (250,835) (194,084) 
BY 34,184 35,141 34,691 6,976 6,147 5,913 0.309 0.275 0.264 4,274,891 4,407,231 4,243,803 
(26,330) (27,151) (25,837) (11,280) (9,052) (7,982) (0.131) (0.123) (0.122) (262,694) (290,241) (219,380) 
SL 32,785 33,343 32,848 5,859 5,175 4,964 0.303 0.269 0.256 299,006 318,922 311,526 
(22,432) (23,983) (23,357) (7,077) (6,770) (6,301) (0.123) (0.118) (0.120) (59,284) (57,246) (39,514) 
BE 33,252 32,860 31,400 5,657 5,065 4,947 0.308 0.268 0.249 958,551 953,737 908,772 
(26,740) (26,767) (26,054) (11,508) (8,354) (9,094) (0.140) (0.133) (0.135) (124,825) (123,849) (86,642) 
BB 27,985 28,466 29,156 5,466 4,650 4,246 0.269 0.234 0.229 742,139 734,397 702,976 
(22,590) (23,490) (23,365) (7,973) (6,422) (5,860) (0.136) (0.129) (0.127) (99,581) (97,004) (65,408) 
MV 26,566 26,903 26,785 5,571 4,730 4,124 0.260 0.225 0.215 484,863 477,469 452,290 
(22,014) (22,499) (22,095) (8,433) (6,349) (5,561) (0.137) (0.129) (0.128) (79,687) (76,526) (50,242) 
SN 26,485 26,347 26,752 5,912 5,030 4,445 0.262 0.222 0.217 1,238,743 1,227,052 1,164,448 
(21,949) (22,201) (22,183) (9,177) (6,749) (6,099) (0.135) (0.130) (0.128) (129,644) (126,153) (84,642) 
ST 26,036 26,275 26,823 5,467 4,558 3,965 0.256 0.221 0.216 719,091 689,597 651,628 
(21,240) (21,721) (22,043) (7,683) (6,069) (5,050) (0.137) (0.129) (0.128) (96,218) (90,504) (61,496) 
TH 25,617 25,988 26,370 5,771 4,769 4,221 0.258 0.224 0.218 706,092 704,049 665,284 
(20,885) (21,248) (21,151) (8,295) (5,975) (5,311) (0.134) (0.126) (0.124) (92,765) (89,928) (59,595) 
Note. Standard deviation in parentheses. Weighted numbers of observations. Non-weighted numbers in parentheses. See Table 3 for 
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Figures A3a-c give the state- and period-specific distributions of effective internalized marginal 
revenues (𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗). Each figure comprises sixteen graphs. In each graph, a state specific distribution 
of 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅  (solid line) is benchmarked against the German average (dashed line). The differences 
between the two distributions mirror differences in the state-specific income distributions and 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅s. 
 
Figure A3a. Distributions of internalized marginal tax revenues (𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅) of an additional taxed Euro, 
1998 
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Figure A3b. Distributions of internalized marginal tax revenues (IMR) of an additional taxed Euro, 
2001 
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Figure A3c. Distributions of internalized marginal tax revenues (IMR) of an additional taxed Euro, 
2004 
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Section 2: Information on the statistical matching 
 
To establish experimental conditions in the treatment analysis (Section 5.2.2), it is important to ensure 
similar distributions of characteristics of tax units in the treatment and control group. The standard 
procedure for doing so is statistical matching. After the matching, the effect of the treatment on the 
treated is estimated over the common support, i.e. the part of the distribution of characteristics that is 
represented among both the treated and the controls. As our analysis relies on repeated cross-sections, 
we have implemented the statistical matching over three groups: the treated and the non-treated in 
the initial period before treatment and the non-treated after treatment. 
Ex ante to the statistical matching we partitioned the treatment and control samples into four sub-
groups by marital and parental status (having children or not). Partitioning means that matches 
between observations in different sub-groups are not allowed. Partitioning by marital and parental 
status is important for the reliability of the estimates of the treatment effects, because tax burdens of 
the partitioned groups differ systematically due to splitting and child-related tax allowances.  
For each partitioned group, we implemented a propensity score based on nearest-neighbor matching 
with replacement and allowing for ties (identical propensity scores): an observation from the potential 
control group was chosen as a matching partner for a treated observation that is closest in terms of 
the propensity score. The matching considers the following characteristics of the tax units: taxable 
base before discretionary deductions; age by means of dummy (age older than 60); three dummies 
for the income composition (income from employment; self-employed and business income; capital 
income). Up to five neighbors were allowed. In case of ties, all neighbors with identical propensity 
scores were considered. 
The following twelve Tables (A3a-l) provide sample statistics for each of the sets of (pseudo-) 
treatment and control groups in Table 6 in the main body of the manuscript. For example, A3a 
provides the sample statistics for 1998/2001 where the treated state is Schleswig-Holstein and the 
control states are Lower Saxony and Rhineland-Palatinate. More precisely, the tables provide means 
and standard deviations of the dependent variable, the amount of tax deductions, and core independent 
variables, with and without propensity-score weighting. These statistics indicate that the matching 
was effective: First, for the treatment group the mean and standard deviation of the dependent variable 
are basically the same with and without propensity-score weighting. Second, means and standard 
deviations of the independent variables with propensity-score weighting for the treatment group 
before treatment and also for the control group before and after treatment are close to the propensity-
score weighted mean for the treatment group after treatment. Third, means and standard deviations 
of the dependent and independent variables in the treatment group after treatment with and without 
propensity-score weighting hardly differ, indicating that the exclusion of observations with lack of 
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common1 support did not lead to systematic changes in the distributions of the variables entering the 
propensity-score weighted regressions. 
 
Table A3a. Sample statistics of treatment and control samples, Schleswig-Holstein 1998/2001 
 Mean (standard deviation) 
 Treatment group Control group 
 𝑇𝑇1 (2001) 𝑇𝑇0 (1998) 𝐶𝐶1 (2001) 𝐶𝐶0 (1998) 
PS weighting: No yes no yes no yes no yes 
∆𝑖𝑖 12,701 12,701 12,772 13,971 13,195 12,809 13,448 14,376 
 (7,625) (7,625) (7,506) (7,667) (7,518) (7,537) (7,446) (7,829) 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖  126,221 126,222 117,678 125,300 129,592 126,251 120,886 125,453 
  (30,485) (30,487) (29,297) (29,418) (28,566) (30,441) (27,747) (29,545) 
𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 0.646 0.646 0.606 0.645 0.690 0.646 0.654 0.645 
  (0.478) (0.478) (0.489) (0.478) (0.462) (0.478) (0.476) (0.479) 
𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 0.884 0.884 0.819 0.860 0.925 0.884 0.873 0.851 
  (1.035) (1.034) (1.025) (1.025) (1.033) (1.027) (1.033) (1.004) 
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚 0.205 0.205 0.192 0.220 0.185 0.204 0.177 0.212 
  (0.404) (0.404) (0.394) (0.414) (0.389) (0.403) (0.381) (0.409) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑦𝑦𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 0.295 0.295 0.331 0.290 0.272 0.295 0.311 0.298 
  (0.456) (0.456) (0.471) (0.454) (0.445) (0.456) (0.463) (0.458) 
𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 0.516 0.516 0.504 0.500 0.515 0.516 0.511 0.506 
  (0.500) (0.500) (0.500) (0.500) (0.500) (0.500) (0.500) (0.500) 
𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 0.428 0.428 0.362 0.442 0.476 0.426 0.400 0.424 
  (0.495) (0.495) (0.480) (0.497) (0.499) (0.494) (0.490) (0.494) 
Note. Treatment group in 2001 is the base sample, treatment group 1998 and control groups in 2001and 1998 are 
matched to the base sample to resemble base sample characteristics. Standard deviation in parentheses. PS denotes 
propensity-score matching, ∆𝑖𝑖 denotes tax deductions, 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 denotes gross taxable income. Data. FAST 1998 and 2001. 
 
 
Table A3b. Sample statistics of treatment and control samples, Schleswig-Holstein 2001/2004 
 Mean (standard deviation) 
 Treatment group Control group 
 𝑇𝑇1 (2004) 𝑇𝑇0 (2001) 𝐶𝐶1 (2004) 𝐶𝐶0 (2001) 
PS weighting: no yes no yes no Yes no yes 
∆𝑖𝑖 12,984 12,982 12,701 12,514 13,396 13,044 13,195 12,697 
 (7,885) (7,883) (7,625) (7,550) (7,768) (7,781) (7,518) (7,451) 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖  125,101 125,105 126,221 125,346 127,240 125,115 129,592 125,397 
  (24,239) (24,224) (30,485) (24,985) (22,103) (24,046) (28,566) (25,533) 
𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 0.654 0.654 0.646 0.654 0.687 0.654 0.690 0.654 
  (0.476) (0.476) (0.478) (0.476) (0.464) (0.476) (0.462) (0.476) 
𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 0.870 0.870 0.884 0.869 0.902 0.848 0.925 0.869 
  (1.020) (1.020) (1.035) (1.036) (1.011) (0.996) (1.033) (1.030) 
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚 0.216 0.216 0.205 0.212 0.185 0.217 0.185 0.218 
  (0.411) (0.411) (0.404) (0.409) (0.389) (0.412) (0.389) (0.413) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑦𝑦𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 0.310 0.310 0.295 0.298 0.302 0.309 0.272 0.301 
  (0.462) (0.462) (0.456) (0.457) (0.459) (0.462) (0.445) (0.459) 
𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 0.521 0.520 0.516 0.520 0.517 0.519 0.515 0.525 
  (0.500) (0.500) (0.500) (0.500) (0.500) (0.500) (0.500) (0.499) 
𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 0.399 0.399 0.428 0.417 0.432 0.400 0.476 0.408 
  (0.490) (0.490) (0.495) (0.493) (0.495) (0.490) (0.499) (0.491) 
1 The numbers of observations with lacking common support can be inferred from Tables A4a-A4f by comparing the 
sample sizes from OLS vs. OLS / matching. 
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Note. Treatment group in 2004 is the base sample, treatment group 2001 and control groups in 2004 and 2001 are 
matched to the base sample to resemble base sample characteristics. Standard deviation in parentheses. PS denotes 
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Table A3c. Sample statistics of treatment and control samples, Bavaria 1998/2001 
 Mean (standard deviation) 
 Treatment group Control group 
 𝑇𝑇1 (2001) 𝑇𝑇0 (1998) 𝐶𝐶1 (2001) 𝐶𝐶0 (1998) 
PS weighting: no yes no yes no Yes no yes 
∆𝑖𝑖 13,429 13,428 13,780 14,880 13,056 13,122 13,493 14,800 
 (7,687) (7,686) (7,548) (7,852) (7,624) (7,634) (7,564) (7,886) 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖  132,894 132,891 125,044 132,202 131,929 132,874 123,789 132,275 
  (25,767) (25,764) (25,441) (24,406) (26,520) (25,877) (26,374) (24,515) 
𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 0.700 0.700 0.692 0.700 0.699 0.700 0.683 0.701 
  (0.458) (0.458) (0.462) (0.458) (0.459) (0.458) (0.465) (0.458) 
𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 0.862 0.862 0.818 0.850 0.862 0.866 0.813 0.847 
  (1.007) (1.007) (1.013) (1.010) (1.009) (1.010) (1.011) (1.006) 
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚 0.161 0.161 0.166 0.157 0.167 0.160 0.171 0.155 
  (0.367) (0.367) (0.372) (0.364) (0.373) (0.367) (0.377) (0.362) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑦𝑦𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 0.323 0.323 0.352 0.312 0.338 0.322 0.368 0.315 
  (0.467) (0.467) (0.478) (0.463) (0.473) (0.467) (0.482) (0.465) 
𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 0.450 0.450 0.472 0.434 0.434 0.451 0.450 0.435 
  (0.498) (0.498) (0.499) (0.496) (0.496) (0.498) (0.497) (0.496) 
𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 0.460 0.460 0.374 0.466 0.451 0.461 0.373 0.467 
  (0.498) (0.498) (0.484) (0.499) (0.498) (0.498) (0.484) (0.499) 
Note. Treatment group in 2001 is the base sample, treatment group 1998 and control groups in 2001and 1998 are 
matched to the base sample to resemble base sample characteristics. Standard deviation in parentheses. PS denotes 
propensity-score matching, ∆𝑖𝑖 denotes tax deductions, 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 denotes gross taxable income. Data. FAST 1998 and 2001. 
 
 
Table A3d. Sample statistics of treatment and control samples, Bavaria 2001/2004 
 Mean (standard deviation) 
 Treatment group Control group 
 𝑇𝑇1 (2004) 𝑇𝑇0 (2001) 𝐶𝐶1 (2004) 𝐶𝐶0 (2001) 
PS weighting: no yes no yes no Yes no yes 
∆𝑖𝑖 13,368 13,368 13,429 12,940 13,160 13,178 13,056 12,650 
 (7,889) (7,889) (7,687) (7,665) (7,853) (7,860) (7,624) (7,600) 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖  129,059 129,059 132,894 129,015 128,687 129,054 131,929 129,409 
  (19,669) (19,667) (25,767) (20,519) (20,240) (19,754) (26,520) (20,536) 
𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 0.677 0.677 0.700 0.677 0.687 0.677 0.699 0.677 
  (0.468) (0.468) (0.458) (0.468) (0.464) (0.468) (0.459) (0.468) 
𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 0.842 0.842 0.862 0.849 0.849 0.844 0.862 0.852 
  (0.991) (0.991) (1.007) (1.009) (0.993) (0.992) (1.009) (1.012) 
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚 0.163 0.162 0.161 0.161 0.167 0.164 0.167 0.159 
  (0.369) (0.369) (0.367) (0.367) (0.373) (0.370) (0.373) (0.366) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑦𝑦𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 0.346 0.346 0.323 0.341 0.362 0.345 0.338 0.345 
  (0.476) (0.476) (0.467) (0.474) (0.481) (0.475) (0.473) (0.475) 
𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 0.453 0.453 0.450 0.449 0.430 0.453 0.434 0.444 
  (0.498) (0.498) (0.498) (0.497) (0.495) (0.498) (0.496) (0.497) 
𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 0.427 0.427 0.460 0.438 0.421 0.427 0.451 0.435 
  (0.495) (0.495) (0.498) (0.496) (0.494) (0.495) (0.498) (0.496) 
Note. Treatment group in 2004 is the base sample, treatment group 2001 and control groups in 2004 and 2001 are 
matched to the base sample to resemble base sample characteristics. Standard deviation in parentheses. PS denotes 
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Table A3e. Sample statistics of treatment and control samples, Brandenburg 1998/2001 
 Mean (standard deviation) 
 Treatment group Control group 
 2001 1998 2001 1998 
PS weighting: no yes no yes no Yes no yes 
∆𝑖𝑖 12,012 12,011 12,595 13,447 12,729 12,418 13,530 14,334 
 (7,225) (7,224) (7,535) (7,527) (7,216) (7,236) (7,656) (7,636) 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖  121,731 121,696 112,588 120,037 119,284 121,617 111,152 120,783 
  (32,057) (32,038) (30,533) (30,369) (33,170) (32,156) (31,233) (30,689) 
𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 0.597 0.597 0.554 0.591 0.560 0.597 0.527 0.594 
  (0.491) (0.491) (0.497) (0.492) (0.496) (0.491) (0.499) (0.491) 
𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 1.015 1.015 0.928 1.009 1.000 1.012 0.949 0.991 
  (0.966) (0.967) (0.968) (0.961) (0.965) (0.969) (0.968) (0.955) 
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚 0.113 0.113 0.091 0.111 0.123 0.115 0.087 0.114 
  (0.317) (0.317) (0.288) (0.314) (0.329) (0.319) (0.282) (0.318) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑦𝑦𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 0.326 0.326 0.356 0.324 0.235 0.325 0.295 0.326 
  (0.469) (0.469) (0.479) (0.468) (0.424) (0.468) (0.456) (0.469) 
𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 0.533 0.533 0.540 0.530 0.638 0.532 0.607 0.532 
  (0.499) (0.499) (0.498) (0.499) (0.481) (0.499) (0.488) (0.499) 
𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 0.349 0.349 0.244 0.351 0.400 0.350 0.257 0.339 
  (0.477) (0.477) (0.429) (0.477) (0.490) (0.477) (0.437) (0.473) 
Note. Treatment group in 2001 is the base sample, treatment group 1998 and control groups in 2001and 1998 are 
matched to the base sample to resemble base sample characteristics. Standard deviation in parentheses. PS denotes 
propensity-score matching, ∆𝑖𝑖 denotes tax deductions, 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 denotes gross taxable income. Data. FAST 1998 and 2001. 
 
 
Table A3f. Sample statistics of treatment and control samples, Brandenburg 2001/2004 
 Mean (standard deviation) 
 Treatment group Control group 
 𝑇𝑇1 (2004) 𝑇𝑇0 (2001) 𝐶𝐶1 (2004) 𝐶𝐶0 (2001) 
PS weighting: no yes no yes no Yes no yes 
∆𝑖𝑖 11,961 11,962 12,012 12,058 12,212 12,010 12,729 12,615 
 (7,446) (7,444) (7,225) (7,161) (7,048) (7,085) (7,216) (7,166) 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖  122,523 122,516 121,731 122,822 120,227 122,539 119,284 122,537 
  (25,442) (25,428) (32,057) (26,053) (27,165) (25,652) (33,171) (27,010) 
𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 0.614 0.615 0.597 0.615 0.585 0.615 0.560 0.614 
  (0.487) (0.487) (0.491) (0.487) (0.493) (0.487) (0.496) (0.487) 
𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 1.032 1.032 1.015 1.026 0.991 0.998 1.000 1.022 
  (0.972) (0.973) (0.966) (0.965) (0.950) (0.942) (0.965) (0.968) 
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚 0.137 0.136 0.113 0.125 0.141 0.137 0.123 0.135 
  (0.344) (0.343) (0.317) (0.331) (0.348) (0.344) (0.329) (0.341) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑦𝑦𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 0.345 0.345 0.326 0.337 0.273 0.339 0.235 0.327 
  (0.475) (0.475) (0.469) (0.473) (0.445) (0.473) (0.424) (0.469) 
𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 0.531 0.531 0.533 0.536 0.622 0.534 0.638 0.545 
  (0.499) (0.499) (0.499) (0.499) (0.485) (0.499) (0.481) (0.498) 
𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 0.323 0.323 0.349 0.331 0.363 0.324 0.400 0.327 
  (0.468) (0.468) (0.477) (0.471) (0.481) (0.468) (0.490) (0.469) 
Note. Treatment group in 2004 is the base sample, treatment group 2001 and control groups in 2004 and 2001 are 
matched to the base sample to resemble base sample characteristics. Standard deviation in parentheses. PS denotes 
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Table A3g. Sample statistics of treatment and control samples, Mecklenburg-W. P. 1998/2001 
 Mean (standard deviation) 
 Treatment group Control group 
 2001 1998 2001 1998 
PS weighting: no yes no yes no Yes no yes 
∆𝑖𝑖 12,733 12,732 13,461 14,167 12,428 12,643 13,151 14,197 
 (7,146) (7,145) (7,537) (7,490) (7,245) (7,245) (7,647) (7,710) 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖  119,233 119,230 111,060 117,656 120,322 119,156 111,780 118,052 
  (33,240) (33,219) (31,347) (31,808) (32,713) (33,342) (30,921) (32,011) 
𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 0.556 0.556 0.523 0.551 0.576 0.556 0.540 0.552 
  (0.497) (0.497) (0.500) (0.497) (0.494) (0.497) (0.498) (0.497) 
𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 1.045 1.045 1.026 1.040 0.995 1.026 0.923 0.992 
  (0.983) (0.983) (1.009) (0.990) (0.961) (0.964) (0.958) (0.944) 
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚 0.126 0.125 0.096 0.128 0.119 0.123 0.087 0.129 
  (0.331) (0.331) (0.295) (0.335) (0.323) (0.329) (0.281) (0.335) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑦𝑦𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 0.239 0.239 0.292 0.254 0.272 0.240 0.321 0.245 
  (0.426) (0.426) (0.455) (0.435) (0.445) (0.427) (0.467) (0.430) 
𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 0.642 0.642 0.611 0.624 0.593 0.643 0.578 0.639 
  (0.479) (0.479) (0.488) (0.485) (0.491) (0.479) (0.494) (0.480) 
𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 0.371 0.371 0.246 0.367 0.385 0.371 0.254 0.380 
  (0.483) (0.483) (0.431) (0.482) (0.487) (0.483) (0.435) (0.485) 
Note. Treatment group in 2001 is the base sample, treatment group 1998 and control groups in 2001and 1998 are 
matched to the base sample to resemble base sample characteristics. Standard deviation in parentheses. PS denotes 
propensity-score matching, ∆𝑖𝑖 denotes tax deductions, 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 denotes gross taxable income. Data. FAST 1998 and 2001. 
 
 
Table A3h. Sample statistics of treatment and control samples, Mecklenburg-W. P. 2001/2004 
 Mean (standard deviation) 
 Treatment group Control group 
 𝑇𝑇1 (2004) 𝑇𝑇0 (2001) 𝐶𝐶1 (2004) 𝐶𝐶0 (2001) 
PS weighting: no yes no yes no Yes no yes 
∆𝑖𝑖 12,279 12,279 12,733 12,705 12,095 12,218 12,428 12,518 
 (7,039) (7,039) (7,146) (7,073) (7,215) (7,170) (7,245) (7,085) 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖  118,818 118,818 119,233 118,658 121,469 118,850 120,322 119,306 
  (28,107) (28,107) (33,240) (28,580) (26,266) (27,929) (32,714) (28,968) 
𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 0.537 0.537 0.556 0.537 0.608 0.537 0.576 0.537 
  (0.499) (0.499) (0.497) (0.499) (0.488) (0.499) (0.494) (0.499) 
𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 0.998 0.998 1.045 1.002 1.006 0.983 0.995 0.984 
  (0.969) (0.969) (0.983) (0.978) (0.955) (0.960) (0.961) (0.963) 
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚 0.152 0.152 0.126 0.148 0.137 0.153 0.119 0.154 
  (0.359) (0.359) (0.331) (0.355) (0.343) (0.360) (0.323) (0.361) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑦𝑦𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 0.231 0.231 0.239 0.225 0.311 0.233 0.272 0.229 
  (0.421) (0.421) (0.426) (0.417) (0.463) (0.423) (0.445) (0.420) 
𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 0.677 0.677 0.642 0.678 0.573 0.678 0.593 0.673 
  (0.468) (0.468) (0.479) (0.467) (0.495) (0.467) (0.491) (0.469) 
𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 0.354 0.354 0.371 0.361 0.349 0.357 0.385 0.374 
  (0.478) (0.478) (0.483) (0.480) (0.477) (0.479) (0.487) (0.484) 
Note. Treatment group in 2004 is the base sample, treatment group 2001 and control groups in 2004 and 2001 are 
matched to the base sample to resemble base sample characteristics. Standard deviation in parentheses. PS denotes 
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Table A3i. Sample statistics of treatment and control samples, Saxony-Anhalt 1998/2001 
 Mean (standard deviation) 
 Treatment group Control group 
 2001 1998 2001 1998 
PS weighting: no yes no yes no Yes no yes 
∆𝑖𝑖 12,530 12,530 13,241 14,050 12,471 12,538 13,197 13,983 
 (7,207) (7,208) (7,689) (7,695) (7,233) (7,209) (7,606) (7,586) 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖  119,146 119,154 111,256 117,540 120,431 119,039 111,781 117,766 
  (33,106) (33,084) (31,132) (31,550) (32,715) (32,978) (30,956) (31,479) 
𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 0.556 0.557 0.525 0.554 0.578 0.557 0.540 0.551 
  (0.497) (0.497) (0.499) (0.497) (0.494) (0.497) (0.498) (0.497) 
𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 0.969 0.969 0.903 0.950 1.016 0.979 0.955 0.978 
  (0.955) (0.955) (0.949) (0.950) (0.968) (0.963) (0.975) (0.967) 
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚 0.130 0.130 0.087 0.135 0.117 0.129 0.089 0.132 
  (0.337) (0.336) (0.282) (0.342) (0.321) (0.335) (0.285) (0.339) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑦𝑦𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 0.231 0.231 0.303 0.230 0.277 0.232 0.320 0.243 
  (0.422) (0.422) (0.459) (0.421) (0.448) (0.422) (0.467) (0.429) 
𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 0.646 0.646 0.602 0.640 0.588 0.648 0.578 0.639 
  (0.478) (0.478) (0.490)  (0.480) (0.492) (0.478) (0.494) (0.480) 
𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 0.402 0.402 0.254 0.405 0.376 0.399 0.252 0.404 
  (0.490) (0.490) (0.435) (0.491) (0.484) (0.490) (0.434) (0.491) 
Note. Treatment group in 2001 is the base sample, treatment group 1998 and control groups in 2001and 1998 are 
matched to the base sample to resemble base sample characteristics. Standard deviation in parentheses. PS denotes 
propensity-score matching, ∆𝑖𝑖 denotes tax deductions, 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 denotes gross taxable income. Data. FAST 1998 and 2001. 
 
 
Table A3j. Sample statistics of treatment and control samples, Saxony-Anhalt 2001/2004 
 Mean (standard deviation) 
 Treatment group Control group 
 𝑇𝑇1 (2004) 𝑇𝑇0 (2001) 𝐶𝐶1 (2004) 𝐶𝐶0 (2001) 
PS weighting: no yes no yes no Yes no yes 
∆𝑖𝑖 11,780 11,781 12,530 12,503 12,254 12,107 12,471 12,555 
 (6,893) (6,892) (7,207) (7,042) (7,281) (7,258) (7,233) (7,093) 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖  120,902 120,913 119,146 120,897 121,025 120,709 120,431 120,826 
  (26,557) (26,547) (33,106) (27,051) (26,650) (26,422) (32,716) (27,389) 
𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 0.612 0.612 0.556 0.612 0.589 0.612 0.578 0.612 
  (0.487) (0.487) (0.497) (0.487) (0.492) (0.487) (0.494) (0.487) 
𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 0.991 0.991 0.969 1.022 1.009 1.032 1.016 1.035 
  (0.927) (0.927) (0.955) (0.962) (0.968) (0.972) (0.968) (0.973) 
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚 0.128 0.127 0.130 0.127 0.143 0.128 0.117 0.130 
  (0.334) (0.333) (0.337) (0.333) (0.351) (0.334) (0.321) (0.336) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑦𝑦𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 0.331 0.331 0.231 0.322 0.285 0.333 0.277 0.322 
  (0.470) (0.471) (0.422) (0.467) (0.451) (0.471) (0.448) (0.467) 
𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 0.567 0.567 0.646 0.574 0.600 0.567 0.588 0.571 
  (0.496) (0.495) (0.478) (0.495) (0.490) (0.495) (0.492) (0.495) 
𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 0.339 0.339 0.402 0.348 0.354 0.335 0.376 0.348 
  (0.474) (0.474) (0.490) (0.477) (0.478) (0.472) (0.484) (0.476) 
Note. Treatment group in 2004 is the base sample, treatment group 2001 and control groups in 2004 and 2001 are 
matched to the base sample to resemble base sample characteristics. Standard deviation in parentheses. PS denotes 
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Table A3k. Sample statistics of treatment and control samples, Thuringia 1998/2001 
 Mean (standard deviation) 
 Treatment group Control group 
 2001 1998 2001 1998 
PS weighting: no yes no yes no Yes no yes 
∆𝑖𝑖 12,941 12,941 13,940 14,555 12,352 12,448 13,011 14,008 
 (7,279) (7,279) (7,703) (7,562) (7,206) (7,204) (7,595) (7,594) 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖  119,477 119,477 111,108 117,358 120,304 119,543 111,791 118,301 
  (33,188) (33,188) (31,265) (31,219) (32,704) (33,163) (30,929) (31,830) 
𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 0.567 0.567 0.533 0.556 0.574 0.567 0.537 0.565 
  (0.496) (0.496) (0.499) (0.497) (0.495) (0.496) (0.499) (0.496) 
𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 0.995 0.995 0.938 0.956 1.008 1.007 0.943 0.983 
  (0.959) (0.959) (0.951) (0.931) (0.967) (0.971) (0.973) (0.959) 
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚 0.114 0.114 0.079 0.119 0.122 0.114 0.091 0.115 
  (0.318) (0.318) (0.270) (0.324) (0.327) (0.318) (0.288) (0.319) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑦𝑦𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 0.235 0.235 0.289 0.237 0.275 0.232 0.323 0.238 
  (0.424) (0.424) (0.453) (0.425) (0.446) (0.422) (0.468) (0.426) 
𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 0.626 0.626 0.611 0.635 0.595 0.630 0.577 0.622 
  (0.484) (0.484) (0.488) (0.481) (0.491) (0.483) (0.494) (0.485) 
𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 0.422 0.422 0.271 0.406 0.371 0.422 0.248 0.422 
  (0.494) (0.494) (0.444) (0.491) (0.483) (0.494) (0.432) (0.494) 
Note. Treatment group in 2001 is the base sample, treatment group 1998 and control groups in 2001and 1998 are 
matched to the base sample to resemble base sample characteristics. Standard deviation in parentheses. PS denotes 
propensity-score matching, ∆𝑖𝑖 denotes tax deductions, 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 denotes gross taxable income. Data. FAST 1998 and 2001. 
 
 
Table A3l. Sample statistics of treatment and control samples, Thuringia 2001/2004 
 Mean (standard deviation) 
 Treatment group Control group 
 𝑇𝑇1 (2004) 𝑇𝑇0 (2001) 𝐶𝐶1 (2004) 𝐶𝐶0 (2001) 
PS weighting: no yes no yes no Yes no yes 
∆𝑖𝑖 12,669 12,669 12,941 12,996 11,973 12,262 12,352 12,545 
 (7,206) (7,206) (7,279) (7,149) (7,170) (7,185) (7,206) (7,107) 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖  120,565 120,565 119,477 120,694 121,115 120,666 120,304 120,677 
  (27,072) (27,072) (33,188) (27,747) (26,495) (27,171) (32,704) (27,763) 
𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 0.593 0.593 0.567 0.593 0.596 0.593 0.574 0.592 
  (0.491) (0.491) (0.496) (0.491) (0.491) (0.491) (0.495) (0.491) 
𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 0.984 0.984 0.995 0.977 1.010 0.993 1.008 0.997 
  (0.961) (0.961) (0.959) (0.955) (0.956) (0.961) (0.967) (0.973) 
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚 0.147 0.147 0.114 0.142 0.137 0.149 0.122 0.143 
  (0.354) (0.354) (0.318) (0.349) (0.344) (0.356) (0.327) (0.350) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑦𝑦𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 0.238 0.238 0.235 0.228 0.314 0.235 0.275 0.243 
  (0.426) (0.426) (0.424) (0.420) (0.464) (0.424) (0.446) (0.429) 
𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 0.643 0.643 0.626 0.644 0.577 0.649 0.595 0.635 
  (0.479) (0.479) (0.484) (0.479) (0.494) (0.477) (0.491) (0.481) 
𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 0.398 0.398 0.422 0.407 0.336 0.393 0.371 0.396 
  (0.490) (0.490) (0.494) (0.491) (0.472) (0.488) (0.483) (0.489) 
Note. Treatment group in 2004 is the base sample, treatment group 2001 and control groups in 2004 and 2001 are 
matched to the base sample to resemble base sample characteristics. Standard deviation in parentheses. PS denotes 
propensity-score matching, ∆𝑖𝑖 denotes tax deductions, 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 denotes gross taxable income. Data. FAST 2004 and 2001. 
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Figures A4a-A4l provide the corresponding propensity score distributions. Each figure contains three 
symmetry plots. Each symmetry plot depicts the propensity score distribution for the treated group 
after treatment (black shaded distribution above the horizontal axis), against one of the three other 
groups, treated before treatment and the control group before and after treatment (distribution below 
the horizontal axis). As can be seen from the graphs, the propensity scores are highly symmetric, 
indicating that the distributions of observational characteristics are similar across groups.  
 
 
Figure A4a. Distribution of Prospensity score for Schleswig-Holstein, matching 1998/2001 
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Figure A4b. Distribution of Prospensity score for Schleswig-Holstein, matching 2001/2004 
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Figure A4c. Distribution of Prospensity score for Bavaria, matching 1998/2001 
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Figure A4d. Distribution of Prospensity score for Bavaria, matching 2001/2004 
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Figure A4e. Distribution of Prospensity score for Brandenburg, matching 1998/2001 
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Figure A4f. Distribution of Prospensity score for Brandenburg, matching 2001/2004 
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Figure A4g. Distribution of Prospensity score for Mecklenburg-W. P., matching 1998/2001 
 













0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1
 











0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1
 











0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1
 












- 55 - 
 
Figure A4h. Distribution of Prospensity score for Mecklenburg-W. P., matching 2001/2004 
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Figure A4i. Distribution of Prospensity score for Saxony-Anhalt, matching 1998/2001 
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Figure A4j. Distribution of Prospensity score for Saxony-Anhalt, matching 2001/2004 
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Figure A4k. Distribution of Prospensity score for Thuringia, matching 1998/2001 
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Figure A4l. Distribution of Prospensity score for Thuringia, matching 2001/2004 
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Section 3: Details on the DID regressions 
 
Table 6 in the main body of the paper provides the average treatment effects of the treated for six sets 
of treatment/control groups. Summaries of the regressions are assembled in Tables A4a-g. Further, 
Table A5 provides another robustness check: In the main body, residents from several states constitute 
the control group. However, it is not ruled out that the control states follow different time trends. For 
this reason, we re-ran the DID regressions considering using only the tax units of a single state as 
controls. The table focuses on Schleswig-Holstein and Bavaria, the two states with time-variant 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅s. 
As an example, for Schleswig-Holstein, the table provides the average treatment effects using either 
the residents of Lower-Saxony or of Rhineland-Palatinate as controls. Further, it provides another 
pseudo treatment and control constellation: Lower-Saxony and Rhineland-Palatinate. 
For Schleswig-Holstein we do not see indications that the common trend assumption is violated. 
Further, if the control state is Lower Saxony, all the results are consistent with the results in the main 
body: a significant positive effect for 1998/2001 and no effect for 2001/2004. If the control state is 
Rhineland-Palatinate, the evidence is mixed: the treatment effect is positive but insignificant for 
1998/2001 and insignificant in 2001/2004. For Bavaria, it seems that Baden-Württemberg and Hesse 
follow different trends. Accordingly, the results for Bavaria in the main body should be interpreted 
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Table A4a. DiD regression details for Schleswig-Holstein 
 Treatment group 1998/2001 Treatment group 2001/2004 
 OLS OLS/ matching OLS OLS/ matching 
𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡ment 209.459** (85.020) 409.685*** (79.945) -82.389 (79.045) -15.384 (76.472) 
𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚 -387.012*** (64.829) -559.195*** (56.751) -138.069*** (53.020) -194.031*** (54.082) 
𝑦𝑦𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚 -1113.256*** (41.928) -1866.631*** (56.736) 416.353*** (37.878) 463.409*** (54.099) 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 0.049*** (0.001) 0.066*** (0.001) 0.049*** (0.001) 0.045*** (0.001) 
𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 3406.606*** (18.366) 3293.604*** (20.933) 4021.165*** (17.330) 4064.599*** (20.264) 
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚 393.531*** (18.945) 440.372*** (21.151) 459.891*** (18.330) 444.261*** (20.711) 
𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 1961.850*** (54.728) 1583.084*** (60.861) 2354.639*** (48.487) 2397.556*** (54.873) 
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 2252.546*** (103.470) 2085.540*** (118.548) 2865.387*** (98.660) 3301.004*** (115.912) 
𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 1782.804*** (43.335) 1562.375*** (48.838) 1868.580*** (39.927) 1869.042*** (46.305) 
𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖. 1820.605*** (44.743) 1745.981*** (50.765) 1751.561*** (41.093) 1826.614*** (47.643) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑦𝑦𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 -2499.622*** (51.306) -2365.135*** (57.209) -2662.444*** (48.050) -2644.004*** (54.596) 
i𝑖𝑖𝑣𝑣𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 898.851*** (42.306) 1099.673*** (47.633) 883.391*** (38.364) 944.796*** (45.939) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡/ 𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚 -179.309*** (43.657) -266.627*** (49.621) -20.154 (40.807) 34.209 (49.238) 
𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 1512.103*** (69.682) 1126.610*** (75.318) 1813.459*** (62.047) 1857.092*** (70.696) 
𝐶𝐶𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 2136.309*** (125.390) 905.122*** (141.337) -40.111 (122.852) 353.638** (145.752) 
R2 0.363  0.364  0.434  0.439  
Observations 1.15e+05  94591.000  1.22e+05  90279.000  
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Levels of significance: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. Data. FAST 1998-2004. 
 
 
Table A4b. DiD regression details for Bavaria 
 Treatment group 1998/2001 Treatment group 2001/2004 
 OLS OLS/ matching OLS OLS/ matching 
𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡ment 139.813*** (49.252) 222.343*** (49.048) -86.632** (42.955) -96.922** (43.940) 
𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚 118.160*** (38.796) 74.101** (34.758) 250.350*** (28.998) 271.296*** (31.078) 
𝑦𝑦𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚 -1080.932*** (31.984) -1837.295*** (34.723) 375.330*** (27.658) 524.355*** (31.097) 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 0.055*** (0.001) 0.077*** (0.001) 0.057*** (0.001) 0.055*** (0.001) 
𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 3447.202*** (12.377) 3288.829*** (12.952) 4086.767*** (11.240) 4127.441*** (11.795) 
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚 544.898*** (12.523) 520.695*** (13.111) 647.801*** (11.394) 646.894*** (11.831) 
𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 2048.125*** (34.071) 1917.503*** (34.469) 2289.071*** (29.177) 2437.166*** (29.616) 
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 809.134*** (99.449) 372.585*** (102.776) 2091.373*** (92.848) 2175.376*** (94.146) 
𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 1789.078*** (29.654) 1481.921*** (30.817) 1857.632*** (26.465) 1893.030*** (27.448) 
𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖. 1560.758*** (30.142) 1324.170*** (31.535) 1401.306*** (27.020) 1391.581*** (28.087) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑦𝑦𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 -2384.635*** (36.922) -2258.901*** (38.590) -2513.288*** (33.397) -2566.463*** (34.464) 
i𝑖𝑖𝑣𝑣𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 932.357*** (27.846) 1435.824*** (27.960) 802.156*** (24.299) 807.362*** (25.468) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡/ 𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚 -681.692*** (30.059) -891.761*** (30.202) -490.204*** (26.823) -434.582*** (28.133) 
𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 1533.326*** (46.281) 1192.267*** (48.105) 1956.150*** (41.581) 1961.547*** (43.632) 
𝐶𝐶𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 916.496*** (86.533) -1022.281*** (94.175) -1420.161*** (82.314) -1491.352*** (92.994) 
R2 0.338  0.332  0.417  0.425  
Observations 2.78e+05  2.71e+05  3.16e+05  2.87e+05  
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Levels of significance: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. Data. FAST 1998-2004. 
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Table A4c. DiD regression details for Brandenburg 
 Treatment group 1998/2001 Treatment group 2001/2004 
 OLS OLS/ matching OLS OLS/ matching 
𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡ment 210.793 (132.827) 451.118*** (130.216) 406.548*** (112.565) 419.492*** (115.004) 
𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚 -792.257*** (103.633) -890.235*** (92.537) -565.757*** (78.195) -543.201*** (81.364) 
𝑦𝑦𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚 -1594.715*** (78.897) -2055.103*** (92.061) -637.962*** (65.547) -528.771*** (81.433) 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 0.033*** (0.001) 0.043*** (0.002) 0.033*** (0.001) 0.031*** (0.001) 
𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 2949.765*** (33.933) 2893.813*** (36.162) 3404.159*** (29.729) 3444.653*** (32.140) 
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚 125.512*** (35.795) 115.764*** (37.908) 118.219*** (31.718) 152.579*** (34.209) 
𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 3492.851*** (103.511) 2988.513*** (105.259) 3474.311*** (83.373) 3320.813*** (84.566) 
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 1652.673*** (216.143) 1450.594*** (256.229) 2304.266*** (185.980) 2372.503*** (223.398) 
𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 1705.710*** (80.429) 1629.765*** (86.230) 2022.121*** (67.409) 2223.886*** (74.719) 
𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖. 2534.458*** (75.696) 2531.332*** (80.207) 2512.267*** (64.649) 2606.445*** (70.307) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑦𝑦𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 -2745.899*** (90.766) -2533.630*** (100.555) -2715.688*** (78.003) -2584.296*** (88.003) 
i𝑖𝑖𝑣𝑣𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 655.577*** (77.465) 724.042*** (80.236) 656.543*** (64.073) 785.478*** (71.931) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡/ 𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚 -191.811** (84.809) -217.609** (88.687) -186.522*** (70.324) -84.260 (80.625) 
𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 755.972*** (133.633) 866.844*** (137.166) 1316.591*** (111.922) 1445.981*** (122.476) 
𝐶𝐶𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 5271.026*** (214.841) 4607.988*** (238.113) 3110.749*** (192.650) 2895.798*** (222.635) 
R2 0.352  0.335  0.402  0.386  
Observations 37502.000  34975.000  44016.000  38760.000  
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Levels of significance: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. Data. FAST 1998-2004. 
 
 
Table A4d. DiD regression details for Mecklenburg-W. P. 
 Treatment group 1998/2001 Treatment group 2001/2004 
 OLS OLS/ matching OLS OLS/ matching 
𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡ment 84.538 (161.644) 95.965 (143.197) 20.965 (137.476) -129.173 (127.823) 
𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚 -32.089 (126.419) -95.710 (101.878) 6.485 (94.577) 98.300 (90.562) 
𝑦𝑦𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚 -1536.771*** (71.320) -1771.715*** (101.127) -501.841*** (59.179) -345.933*** (90.463) 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 0.032*** (0.001) 0.040*** (0.002) 0.033*** (0.001) 0.031*** (0.002) 
𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 2950.947*** (33.999) 2780.321*** (39.648) 3403.301*** (29.751) 3310.013*** (35.870) 
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚 125.463*** (35.850) 74.986* (41.635) 118.435*** (31.739) 114.748*** (37.321) 
𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 3482.505*** (103.657) 3607.959*** (120.895) 3475.430*** (83.439) 3802.814*** (96.656) 
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 1779.784*** (216.574) 1215.780*** (219.676) 2369.101*** (186.204) 2120.179*** (192.364) 
𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 1743.534*** (80.436) 1395.001*** (93.412) 2046.130*** (67.373) 1907.735*** (80.388) 
𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖. 2588.546*** (75.610) 2279.565*** (88.193) 2541.780*** (64.584) 2424.717*** (77.576) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑦𝑦𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 -2734.160*** (90.894) -2801.324*** (102.818) -2713.406*** (78.061) -2750.878*** (89.245) 
i𝑖𝑖𝑣𝑣𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 669.840*** (77.560) 617.342*** (86.570) 665.225*** (64.109) 543.143*** (77.511) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡/ 𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚 -165.785* (84.877) -451.699*** (93.691) -169.197** (70.320) -272.068*** (84.740) 
𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 757.056*** (133.832) 571.503*** (147.623) 1315.489*** (112.002) 1143.130*** (128.823) 
𝐶𝐶𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 5006.180*** (213.148) 5059.424*** (256.340) 2930.935*** (191.939) 3154.136*** (235.167) 
R2 0.350  0.348  0.401  0.395  
Observations 37502.000  28203.000  44016.000  29865.000  
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Levels of significance: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. Data. FAST 1998-2004. 
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Table A4e. DiD regression details for Saxony-Anhalt 
 Treatment group 1998/2001 Treatment group 2001/2004 
 OLS OLS/ matching OLS OLS/ matching 
𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡ment -91.039 (145.368) -92.951 (134.628) -468.984*** (122.358) -225.731* (116.847) 
𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚 151.693 (112.720) 104.697 (95.696) 72.482 (85.999) -25.916 (82.633) 
𝑦𝑦𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚 -1496.742*** (74.157) -1621.756*** (95.186) -376.275*** (61.840) -437.002*** (82.689) 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 0.032*** (0.001) 0.036*** (0.002) 0.032*** (0.001) 0.032*** (0.001) 
𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 2951.946*** (33.985) 2868.677*** (37.832) 3402.617*** (29.743) 3426.903*** (32.976) 
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚 125.226*** (35.846) 82.193** (38.876) 120.090*** (31.733) 36.398 (35.389) 
𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 3483.533*** (103.651) 3749.764*** (111.697) 3482.803*** (83.422) 3468.427*** (91.775) 
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 1771.042*** (216.243) 1670.587*** (218.830) 2388.055*** (185.856) 2704.079*** (199.128) 
𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 1742.293*** (80.461) 1525.858*** (86.730) 2039.685*** (67.366) 2144.357*** (74.930) 
𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖. 2585.663*** (75.656) 2474.638*** (82.883) 2535.370*** (64.561) 2636.706*** (70.920) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑦𝑦𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 -2735.106*** (90.886) -2843.617*** (95.991) -2719.186*** (78.042) -2652.343*** (88.270) 
i𝑖𝑖𝑣𝑣𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 669.662*** (77.556) 713.002*** (79.440) 660.542*** (64.095) 769.942*** (72.760) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡/ 𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚 -167.280** (84.886) -305.946*** (85.824) -168.307** (70.308) -118.048 (79.163) 
𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 757.694*** (133.822) 623.982*** (136.434) 1309.046*** (111.980) 1428.438*** (124.374) 
𝐶𝐶𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 4962.119*** (214.053) 4993.353*** (238.769) 2919.700*** (192.238) 3116.565*** (224.406) 
R2 0.350  0.352  0.402  0.390  
Observations 37502.000  31916.000  44016.000  35853.000  
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Levels of significance: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. Data. FAST 1998-2004. 
 
Table A4f. DiD regression details for Thuringia 
 Treatment group 1998/2001 Treatment group 2001/2004 
 OLS OLS/ matching OLS OLS/ matching 
𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡ment -292.879* (152.654) -72.719 (137.851) -16.913 (127.367) -46.843 (122.790) 
𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚 920.603*** (120.286) 690.623*** (98.277) 639.290*** (88.214) 572.531*** (86.934) 
𝑦𝑦𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚 -1466.257*** (72.460) -1787.948*** (97.294) -493.852*** (60.617) -369.735*** (86.978) 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 0.033*** (0.001) 0.040*** (0.002) 0.033*** (0.001) 0.030*** (0.002) 
𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 2953.584*** (33.935) 2790.211*** (38.785) 3405.410*** (29.714) 3357.328*** (34.720) 
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚 133.054*** (35.805) 178.187*** (40.239) 123.681*** (31.707) 137.321*** (36.238) 
𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 3478.706*** (103.512) 3528.174*** (115.791) 3472.781*** (83.333) 3857.003*** (94.702) 
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 1866.491*** (215.925) 1742.321*** (257.952) 2424.963*** (185.690) 2343.100*** (227.168) 
𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 1722.791*** (80.350) 1467.155*** (89.284) 2021.842*** (67.336) 1978.319*** (76.540) 
𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖. 2563.898*** (75.541) 2414.886*** (84.836) 2516.908*** (64.519) 2466.859*** (73.699) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑦𝑦𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 -2751.141*** (90.780) -2843.773*** (99.862) -2732.950*** (77.990) -2877.882*** (88.531) 
i𝑖𝑖𝑣𝑣𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 647.359*** (77.486) 682.303*** (80.319) 641.994*** (64.075) 678.814*** (71.892) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡/ 𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚 -183.960** (84.787) -355.991*** (86.443) -188.699*** (70.269) -226.046*** (78.283) 
𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 759.784*** (133.640) 533.870*** (144.397) 1311.591*** (111.876) 1251.693*** (125.691) 
𝐶𝐶𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 4777.421*** (213.657) 4459.481*** (245.680) 2773.909*** (192.085) 3018.865*** (230.177) 
R2 0.352  0.345  0.403  0.394  
Observations 37502.000  30680.000  44016.000  33044.000  
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Levels of significance: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. Data. FAST 1998-2004. 
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Table A5. Average treatment effects of the treated (att) for additional control groups 
State 
(treatment group) Control group 
Treatment period 
1998/2001 2001/2004 
OLS OLS/ matching OLS OLS/ matching 
Schleswig-Holstein Lower Saxony 278.798*** 469.024*** -109.735 -82.735 
Schleswig-Holstein Rhineland-Palat. 90.338 33.777 -29.430 48.744 
Rhineland-Palat. Lower Saxony 198.276** 17.759 -85.664 -76.024 
Bavaria Hesse 130.060** 45.737 -142.481*** -196.271*** 
Bavaria Baden-Wurttemberg 140.744** 258.019*** -32.578 6.027 
Hesse Baden-Wurttemberg 10.943 80.646 111.861** 131.429** 
Note. Levels of significance: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. Control groups are subject to similar a 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅 experienced by the treatment 
group after treatment. . Sample consists of “rich” tax units with gross taxable income in the top income bracket (𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 > 60.000 




- 65 - 
 
Section 4: Modelling of the German Fiscal Equalization System 
 
Germany’s fiscal equalization scheme entails several interacting sub-systems that redistribute the 
taxes collected by the states’ tax authorities in two directions: vertically to the federal level and 
horizontally across states. Total tax revenue of a state originates from two sources: the so-called 
“own-source” taxes and joint taxes. Own-source taxes are administered and collected by the states 
(or municipalities), and the generated tax revenue benefits the state (or municipality) exclusively. 
Inheritance, property acquisition, and lottery taxes are examples for own-source taxes. Revenues from 
own-source taxes contribute only a small fraction of total tax revenue, however. Joint taxes (income, 
corporation and value added tax) contribute the lion’s share of tax revenue. In the year 2011, for 
example, joint taxes made up about 70 percent of total tax revenue.2 The common characteristic of 
joint taxes is that the tax revenue is shared by the three levels of government: federal, state, and local. 
A four-stage equalization system assigns joint taxes to the three levels:3 
1. Initial assignment of joint taxes by means of politically determined vertical distribution 
rules: Fixed proportions of states’ tax revenues are assigned to the federal level and the 
states. 
2. Horizontal redistribution of up to 25 percent of state-specific revenues from value added 
taxes (VAT). The aim of the VAT redistribution (Umsatzsteuervorwegausgleich) is to 
ensure that each state receives at least 92 percent of average per capita tax revenue of 
all states (mainly the states’ shares of income and corporate taxes and some state taxes). 
3. Horizontal redistribution of fiscal revenues from financially strong states to financially 
weak states. A state’s payments/transfers depend on deviations of its fiscal revenue per 
(virtual)4 capita and average fiscal revenue per capita over all states. Fiscal revenues of 
a state covers its share of income and value added tax, revenues from pure state taxes 
like inheritance or beer tax and 50 percent of the most important local taxes’ (i.e. local 
business tax and property tax). The aim of the third stage (“Finanzausgleich im engeren 
Sinne”) is to ensure that each state receives at least 95 percent of the average (per capita) 
fiscal revenue. 
4. Vertical transfers from the federal to the state level. The aim of the vertical transfers 
(“Fehlbetragsbundesergänzungszuweisungen”) is to improve the financial situation of 
2 Of the remaining 30 percent, 17 percent of the revenue is channeled to the federal level. Federal taxes include energy 
taxes, motor vehicle taxes, various consumer taxes (e.g., tobacco, alcohol and insurance taxes) and the solidarity 
surcharge. Roughly some two percent of total tax revenue is state taxes. The remaining nine percent is channeled to the 
local level in form of property, business and some local consumption taxes (Federal Ministry of Finance, 2012). 
3 Part of the equalization system changed in 2005. As our data are only available up to 2004 we describe the equalization 
system valid as existed. However, the main mechanisms have remained in place since then. 
4 For some states with specific financial burdens, population size is adjusted by particular weighting factors. 
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those states whose fiscal revenue still falls below the inter-state average after stages 1 
to 3. The grants are uncommitted and cover at least 90 percent of the remaining gap 
between fiscal revenue and fiscal need. Accordingly, all states effectively end up with 
at least 99.5 percent of average per capita fiscal revenue. 
In addition, special needs grants (Sonderbedarfsbundesergänzungszuweisungen) compensate for 
special fiscal burdens some states have to bear. These grants are given lump-sum, regardless of fiscal 
or economic performance. 
Our accounting model is implemented in STATA and covers all the legal rules codified in the German 
fiscal equalization law (Finanzausgleichsgesetz, FAG) for the period 1998 to 2004. The necessary 
federal and state-level information on tax revenues, population sizes, indebtedness, etc. come from 
the German Federal Ministry of Finance. The model proceeds in two stages. In the first stage, the 
model determines every state’s actual tax returns after fiscal equalization, 𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗, using official data on 
tax revenues, population size, etc. from the Federal Ministry of Finance as input. In the second stage, 
the tax-back rates are derived. The tax-back rate of state 𝑗𝑗 is derived by increasing the state’s actual 
income tax revenue before equalization by a hypothetical marginal amount (€1,000,000) holding all 
other inputs constant. Based on this variation, the model determines the new tax returns after fiscal 
equalization, 𝑅𝑅�𝑠𝑠. The state’s marginal tax-back rate is the ratio of the change in tax returns after fiscal 
equalization and the marginal tax base variation, 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗 = �𝑅𝑅�𝑗𝑗 − 𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗�/1,000,000. The second step is 
implemented for all 16 states and for all three periods of analysis. 
The results from the first stage are consistent with available official statistics. Particularly, it 
reproduces the actual tax entitlements of the states after fiscal equalization from publications by the 
Federal Council (Bundesrat) and provided by the Federal Ministry of Finance detailed below. Further, 
if possible, we have cross-checked our 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑏𝑏 with simulations in earlier works (Baretti et al., 2002, 
and http://www.laenderfinanzausgleich.com): 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅s from our simulations and theirs coincide. 
 
Relevant official publications by the German Federal Ministry of Finance: 
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